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Although there is much debate about whether lawyers should have
gatekeeping duties to avert client illegality and prevent harm to the capital
markets, few have examined the fiery rhetoric that fuels this ongoing con-
troversy. This Article explores the rhetoric deployed by the legal profession
to ward off the federal regulation of lawyers who appear and practice
before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). After describing
three canonical battles between the SEC and the bar, it identifies and exam-
ines the powerful rhetoric of "lawyer exceptionalism"-the notion that law-
yers' societal function is unique and qualitatively different from that of
other professionals who have legal obligations to avert fraud-and that this
unique function is so valiant and virtuous that lawyers should be exempt
from these gatekeeping obligations. The claim of lawyer exceptionalism
hinges on the implicit invocation of particular images-the most important
being the image of the lawyer as a litigator engaged in zealous advocacy.
This Article demonstrates how these images-or, more accurately, "proto-
types"-are used to persuade audiences that gatekeeping is fundamentally
inconsistent with the practice of law. Moreover, it argues that the image of
the litigator engaged in zealous advocacy is both exaggerated and mislead-
ing in the domain of the federal securities regulation of lawyers. This Arti-
cle then offers suggestions on how to undermine the rhetoric of lawyer
exceptionalism.
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INTRODUCTION
OU'RE the corporate lawyer. Your largest client is a publicly-
traded company in the equipment leasing business. The company
has always had cash flow problems. Recently, however, the situa-
tion has turned dire due to the credit crunch. In fact, the company's cash
flow position is now so bad that a critical loan covenant in the company's
debt arrangements may soon be triggered. If triggered, the company will
have to terminate sales and wind up its operations.
The chief executive officer (CEO) of this company solicits your help in
doing what you've always done for the company: draft and review press
releases and documents for public filing. But the CEO wants to release
only upbeat news about the firm's finances and wants to continue to con-
ceal the existence of this loan covenant.
You say, "The rules require you to tell the truth."
He responds, "You're my lawyer; I'm the client; that's my call. It's all
on me. Anyways, everything will turn out just fine. It always does."
What do you do? Do you resign? Do you tell the Board? Do you flag
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)? Do you rock the boat?
Or do you assist him, perhaps grudgingly, in preparing those documents?
Unfortunately, this situation is not fictitious, but based on an actual
Lawyer Exceptionalism
case, In re Carter,' discussed below. Although the two lawyers involved
in the case were troubled by the CEO's misbehavior and urged compli-
ance on several occasions, they did not stand their ground. Rather, at
least one of the lawyers assisted the CEO in preparing the deceptive dis-
closures, and both lawyers continued to advise the CEO while he per-
sisted in committing securities fraud.2 Eventually, the company went
bankrupt and the fraud was revealed.3
For decades, the SEC has sought to deter precisely this type of lawyer
misconduct: the acquiescence in (and, in some cases, facilitation of) cor-
porate frauds perpetrated by senior managers.4 Besides suing lawyers for
professional misconduct, the SEC has tried to clarify and prescribe af-
firmative duties to avert client illegality, backed by the threat of adminis-
trative or civil sanction. In doing so, the SEC was acting on the premise
that lawyers were indeed "gatekeepers," defined as "private in-
termediaries who can prevent harm to the securities markets by dis-
rupting the misconduct of their client representatives," 5 and that it was
1. See In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,149 & n.13 (Feb. 28, 1981); infra Part I.B.
2. See id. $T 84,154 & 84,157-58; infra note 65. Importantly, the lawyers never re-
signed and never notified the Board, the SEC, or the investors.
3. Id. 84,165.
4. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securi-
ties Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 727, 730 (concluding that
fraud on securities markets are typically committed by senior managers-rather than
lower-level employees-without the approval of either the board or a majority of share-
holders); Elizabeth MacDonald & Joann S. Lublin, SEC May Put Small Firms in Audit
Plan: Proposals for Strengthening Corporate Audit Panels Influenced by New Data, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 25, 1999, at A2 (reporting a study of more than 200 corporate fraud cases
brought by the SEC, which found that in 83% of the cases, the CEO, CFO, or both, were
involved in the fraud).
5. This definition of gatekeepers first appeared in Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside
Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 413 (2008), but is modified and adapted from that set
forth in Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (describing "gatekeeper liability" as "liability
imposed on private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their coop-
eration from wrongdoers"). Although gatekeeping is not confined to the capital markets
context, this Article focuses only on the role of lawyers as gatekeepers in the capital mar-
kets context. As classically defined, the gatekeeper is a third party who "supplements ef-
forts to deter primary wrongdoers directly by enlisting their associates and market contacts
as de facto 'cops on the beat."' See id.; see also Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gate-
keepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 917 (1998) (noting that gatekeepers are third-party reputa-
tional intermediaries that perform certification services).
For alternative definitions of "gatekeeper," see, for example, JOHN C. COFFEE JR.,
GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2-3 (2006) (advancing
an alternative definition of "gatekeeper" as an "agent who acts as a reputational interme-
diary to assure investors as to the quality of the 'signal' sent by the corporate issuer");
Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49
MD. L. REV. 869, 883 (1990) (defining a gatekeeper as "someone in a position to decline to
provide . . . service to those who would misuse it"); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability,
77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 58 (2003) (defining "gatekeepers" as "parties who sell a product or
provide a service that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular market or engage
in certain activities"); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a
Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 491, 491 n.2 (2001) (not committing to
a definition of "gatekeeper" but presuming that the definition would include "investment
banking, accounting firms, and law firms in their activities related to securities issues");
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reasonable to impose gatekeeping duties on lawyers.
But the SEC's efforts to impose gatekeeping obligations on lawyers
have been fiercely (and almost uniformly) opposed by the bar in highly
contentious debates that I call the "gatekeeping wars." These battles rose
to a fevered pitch when, in the wake of Enron,6 Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley), which authorized the SEC
to regulate "attorneys appearing and practicing before" the SEC "in any
way in the representation of issuers."7
In those historic battles with the SEC, the bar has repeatedly invoked
the powerful rhetoric of "lawyer exceptionalism" 8-the notion that law-
yers' societal function differs from that of all other professionals (such as
accountants) who have legal obligations to avert fraud, and that this
unique function is so valiant and virtuous that lawyers should be exempt
from gatekeeping obligations. The persuasive power of lawyer exception-
alism lies not so much in explicitly reasoned argument but in its implicit
invocation of particular images, such as the litigator engaged in zealous
advocacy. As natural as that image is, it is exaggerated and deeply mis-
leading in this regulatory context.
Part I sets the stage by describing the central battles of the gatekeeping
wars.9 These battles have not only incubated the rhetoric of lawyer ex-
ceptionalism but have also shaped the American Bar Association's posi-
tion on lawyers' duties when encountering managerial illegality. While I
am not the first to describe these battles,10 prior accounts have not con-
centrated on the discursive terms upon which they have been waged.
Part II dissects the bar's rhetoric of lawyer exceptionalism to explore
why the rhetoric rings so true to so many. By mining this rhetoric, I show
Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 746-66 (2004) (relaxing the third-party ele-
ment of the definition by positing the SEC as gatekeeper).
6. See COFFEE, supra note 5, at 16 (noting that "gatekeepers failed en masse").
7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
8. While this Article is the first to address lawyer exceptionalism in the area of pro-
fessional regulation and professional responsibility, other scholars have addressed lawyer
exceptionalism in other political contexts. See, e.g., HEINz EULAU & JOHN D. SPRAGUE,
LAWYERS IN POLITICS (1964); MARK C. MILLER, Are Lawyers Really Different from
Nonlawyers? in THE HIGH PRIESTS OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS IN
AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONs 76-94 (1995); David R. Derge, The Lawyer as Deci-
sion-Maker in the American State Legislature, 21 J. PoLrInCs 408, 408-09 (1959); David R.
Derge, The Lawyer in the Indiana General Assembly, 6 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 19, 19-20
(1962); John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers for Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology, and Social
Distance, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 5, 34 (2003); Robert L. Nelson et al., Lawyers and the
Structure of Influence in Washington, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 237, 293 (1988).
9. Although the concept of "gatekeepers" can be broadly applied, this Article deals
only with gatekeeping in the capital markets context, the only context over which the SEC
maintains jurisdiction.
10. For superb analyses of the bar's canonical battles with the SEC, see Susan P.
Koniak, When Courts Refuse to Frame the Law and Others Frame It to Their Will, 66 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1079-84 (1993) [hereinafter Koniak, When Courts Refuse]; Susan P.
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly's Done: The Bar's Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 1236, 1248-60 (2003) [hereinafter Koniak, The Bar's Struggle]; Susan P. Koniak, Cor-




that the claim of lawyer exceptionalism is predicated on three images: (i)
the litigator to represent lawyers, (ii) the auditor to represent gatekeep-
ers, and (iii) the human manager to represent clients. The first two
images-or more accurately "prototypes"-generate a contrast effect.
Primed by the bar's rhetoric and our culture, when we think about law-
yers, we envision the litigator; when we think about gatekeepers, we envi-
sion the auditor. Comparing litigators with auditors leads us to see
lawyers and gatekeepers as separate and distinct categories, widely diver-
gent in their key functions and attributes. Thus, the practice of lawyering
appears fundamentally inconsistent with the practice of gatekeeping.
This contrast effect bolsters the descriptive claim that lawyers are unique.
The third image-the human manager as client-fuels a client confu-
sion, in which the human manager, and not the corporation, is mistaken
for the true client. This confusion makes us think that gatekeeping obli-
gations force the lawyer to betray her noble role as faithful and zealous
advocate of her client. Accordingly, this client confusion bolsters the nor-
mative claim that lawyers' function is so valiant and virtuous that lawyers
should be exempt from gatekeeping obligations.
Part III offers suggestions on how to counter the rhetoric of lawyer
exceptionalism. To reduce the contrast effect, we can highlight overlap-
ping functions and attributes of lawyers and other gatekeepers to under-
mine the descriptive claim that lawyers are unique. To counter the client
confusion, we can emphasize that, for representations governed by
Sarbanes-Oxley, the true client is the public corporation and not the
human manager. Accordingly, gatekeeping obligations that require law-
yers to withstand errant managers do not force the lawyer to betray her
true client. Instead, gatekeeping duties publicly reaffirm the lawyer's du-
ties to the actual client, the corporation. Taking these countermeasures
will enable all those interested, whether it be the SEC, politicians, or
other stakeholders, to better parry the bar's sometimes blustery backlash.
A few final points of clarification. This Article's primary purpose is to
analyze the appeal of the bar's rhetoric of anti-regulation-in short, how
the technologies of persuasion work the way that they do (and how they
might be countered). It is not to interrogate why the bar resists gatekeep-
ing, which is a matter discussed in a companion piece." It is also not to
make any systematic affirmative case that lawyers should be gatekeepers
(although I believe that a strong case can be made).12 The focus here is
sharply on understanding how the rhetoric functions-something that
should interest all sides of the gatekeeping wars.
I. THREE CANONICAL BATJTLES
The disaster that was Enron took place in 2001 and 2002. Congress's
response through Sarbanes-Oxley happened soon thereafter, although
11. Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest? Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeep-
ing (draft manuscript, on file with author).
12. See infra notes 372-74 and accompanying text.
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the bickering over final SEC regulations languished for months. Now, in
2010, one might assume that the once tangled triangle of fraud, lawyer
complicity, and SEC enforcement has worked itself out. But any such
assumption would ignore a complex history going back to at least the
1970s. For decades, the organized bar and the SEC have been sparring
over the duty of lawyers to stop fraud and the reach of SEC authority
over their (mis)behavior. Each battle within that war, no matter how
seemingly final, reveals itself through the long lens of history to be just
the next iteration. This Part provides some sense of that history by high-
lighting three canonical battles that have incubated the rhetoric of lawyer
exceptionalism: SEC v. National Student Marketing, In re Carter, and
Sarbanes-Oxley.13
A. SEC v. NATIONAL STUDENT MARKETING CORP.
Although the SEC has had longstanding civil and administrative au-
thority to prosecute lawyers for assisting a securities fraud,14 it was not
until the 1970s that it began to do so.1 5 In 1972, the SEC sued two promi-
nent law firms and three specific partners for their role in the merger of
Interstate National Corporation (Interstate) into National Student Mar-
keting Corporation (NSMC).1 6 Before closing the merger,17 the parties
learned that NSMC's interim financial statements were wildly inaccurate.
Instead of a profit of $700,000, NSMC had suffered a net loss of approxi-
13. A few other cases are also significant but, due to space constraints, are not dis-
cussed here. See, e.g., In re Gutfreund, Exchange Act Release No. 31554, 52 SEC Docket
2849 (Dec. 3, 1992); In re Kern, Exchange Act Release No. 29,356, 49 SEC Docket 422
(June 21, 1991), affg in part and vacating in part [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 84,342 (Nov. 14, 1988); see also supra note 10.
14. For authority to bring civil injunction actions in federal district courts to enjoin
violations of securities laws, see Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2006);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2006); THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 16.2[2] (5th ed. 2006). For
authority to bring disciplinary actions in administrative proceedings against securities pro-
fessionals for "improper professional conduct" or having "caused a violation of securities
laws," see HAZEN, supra, § 16.2[18].
15. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 154 (1989) (noting that "half the
proceedings against lawyers initiated by the SEC between 1935 and 1980 were begun after
1975").
16. The final court opinion (from which most of the factual description comes) can be
found in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978). The
defendant law firms were Lord, Bissell & Brook (LBB) and White & Case. Other defend-
ants included NSMC, directors of both companies, and the accounting firm and two of its
partners. Id. at 686-87. Interstate was an insurance holding company, and NSMC was a
provider of goods and services to college and high school students. Id. at 688.
17. Before the closing date, the boards of both companies had approved the merger
and secured shareholder approval. Id. at 691.
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mately $80,000.18 Failing to disclose these materiall 9 adjustments to
shareholders (who had already approved the merger) would violate the
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 20 Nevertheless, the
parties plodded ahead.21 Lawyers on both sides opined that the transac-
tion was "in full compliance with applicable law," and the merger
closed.22 Afterwards, no one disclosed the truth to the former Interstate
shareholders, who had sold their shares based on a colossal
misunderstanding. 23
When the SEC discovered the fraud, it filed a civil enforcement action
against the lawyers and their firms for aiding and abetting a securities
fraud. 24 The SEC argued that lawyers have affirmative gatekeeping re-
sponsibilities: once a lawyer knows that a client is committing securities
fraud, she has an obligation to insist that the client stop or rectify the
fraud and, if unsuccessful, resign and disclose the unrectified fraud in a
notice to the SEC.2 5 This was not meant to be a radical reformulation of
the lawyer's duties. Indeed, the model professional conduct codes-in-
cluding the then-current Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(Model Code)-issued by the American Bar Association (ABA) and
18. Specifically, the accountants determined that "a $500,000 adjustment to deferred
costs, a $300,000 write-off of unbilled receivables, and an $84,000 adjustment to paid-in
capital be made retroactive to May 31 and be reflected in the comfort letter to be delivered
to Interstate." Id. at 691. The accountants' "comfort letter" (which was ultimately signed
and delivered post-closing) stated that NSMC "would have shown a net loss of approxi-
mately $80,000." Id. at 695.
19. See id. at 696 n.25 (noting a statement by Interstate's chief financial officer reacted
that "the deferred cost adjustment of $500,000 was 'a hell of a big adjustment.'"); id. at 709
(noting that "[t]here is no doubt that the adjustments were material, and therefore [the
parties] should have refused to proceed with the merger absent disclosure to and resolicita-
tion of the shareholders"); id. at 713 (noting the "obvious materiality" of the information).
20. See id. at 701-12.
21. Id. at 694 (describing how the closing took place, including the CEO of Interstate's
deferral to its counsel on the issue of whether the closing could proceed on the basis of the
accounting firm's unsigned draft comfort letter).
22. Id. at 690. The lawyers for both parties issued an opinion letter stating that its
client had taken all actions required by law and that "transactions in connection with the
merger had been duly and validly taken, to the best knowledge of counsel, in full compli-
ance with applicable law." Id. (stating the merger agreement condition). The parties closed
the merger on the basis of the accounting firm's unsigned draft comfort letter, which did
not conform to the requirements of the merger agreement. See id. at 693-94.
23. Id. at 696-97. Nothing was done in spite of the fact that, after the merger closed,
NSMC's accounting firm delivered its not-so-comforting comfort letter, which specifically
urged both companies to resolicit shareholder approval based upon corrected financial
statements. See id. at 695-96.
24. Specifically, the lawyers were charged with (i) failing to intervene by making an
effort to halt the merger, (ii) inappropriately issuing an opinion letter that effectively
"blessed" the transaction, and (iii) failing to withdraw that opinion and notify either the
Interstate shareholders or the SEC, and (iv) issuing an opinion confirming the validity of
post-merger stock sales under Rule 133. See id. at 712.
25. See SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. 1 93,360 (D.D.C. complaint filed Feb. 3, 1972) ("The law firms should have refused
to issue the opinion letters and should have insisted that the financial statements be revised
and the shareholders be resolicited, claimed the Commission. If that advice was ignored,
the Commission contended, the attorneys should have ceased representing their respective




adopted by virtually every state, had already taken a similar position.26
Nevertheless, the bar vigorously insisted that the duty of confidentiality
trumped any duty to disclose fraud. 27
Indeed, the SEC's complaint stunned the legal community. This was,
after all, the first time in almost forty years of federal securities regulation
that "reputable outside lawyers" had been sued by the SEC.2 8 Commen-
tators declared that "a new epoch had commenced" 29 and that there was
a "revolution" in the securities regulation of lawyers.30 Lawyers
"scrambl[ed] for copies" of the complaint and were "deeply shaken" by
the fact that the SEC had charged "prestigious law firms."31 The Wall
Street Journal reported that almost every firm with a sizable securities law
practice had met to discuss the case's implications.32 Some insurance
companies reportedly refused to insure liabilities arising out of securities
transactions.33
The ABA went straight to work. It basically repealed the Model
Code's rule requiring lawyers to reveal an unrectified fraud against a
third party or tribunal.34 Reversing course, it now insisted that disclosing
26. See Koniak, When Courts Refuse, supra note 10, at 1080. For mandatory disclo-
sure, see MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1969) ("A lawyer
who receives information clearly establishing that . . . [h]is client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the
fraud to the affected person or tribunal."); CANONS OF PROF'L ETmics Canon 41 (1968)
("When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been practiced, which has
unjustly imposed upon . .. a party, he should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his
client, and if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he should
promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that they may take appropriate
steps."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Rectification of Client Fraud: Death and Revival of a
Professional Norm, 33 EMORY L.J. 271, 292-93 (1984) (interpreting Canon 41 as a
mandatory direction to act). For permissive disclosure, see CANONS OF PROF'L ETmics
Canon 37 (1968) ("The announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included
within the confidences which [a lawyer] is bound to respect."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1969) ("A lawyer may reveal ... [tihe intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."). With re-
spect to withdrawal, see id. DR 2-110(B)(2), (C)(1)(b), C(2) (mandating that a lawyer
withdraw from representation if "[h]e knows or it is obvious that his continued employ-
ment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule" and permitting him to withdraw if his
client "[p]ersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct" or "[h]is continued em-
ployment is likely to result in a violation of a Disciplinary Rule").
27. Koniak, When Courts Refuse, supra note 10, at 1080; see infra notes 34-36.
28. J. Gordon Cooney, The Implications of the Revolution in Securities Regulation for
Lawyers, 29 Bus. LAw. 130, 129 (1974).
29. Junius Hoffman, On Learning ofa Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-the Law-
yer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1390 (1978).
30. See Cooney, supra note 28, at 129.
31. Hoffman, supra note 29, at 1390 n.4 (quoting Wayne E. Green, Irate Attorneys: A
Bid to Hold Lawyers Accountable to Public Stuns, Angers Firms, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15,
1972, at 1). One prominent Washington attorney said, "I'd state conservatively that securi-
ties lawyers are shaking in their boots." Id.
32. Id.
33. Cooney, supra note 28, at 130, 134-35.
34. The repeal of the Model Code rule requiring disclosure was effectuated in two
stages. First, in February 1974, the ABA House of Delegates amended the Code to provide
that the lawyer's duty to withhold "privileged communication[s]" trumped any mandate to
disclose fraud. See ABA, Proceedings of the 1974 Midyear Meeting of the House of Dele-
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information gained "in the professional relationship," which "would be
likely to be detrimental to the client," was flatly prohibited.35 As noted
by Ronald Rotunda, this change effectively "engulf[ed] the entire disclo-
sure requirement," making a "mirage" out of the pre-existing duty to re-
veal fraud.36
In addition, the ABA adopted a policy statement challenging the SEC's
authority to impose disclosure duties on lawyers.37 The ABA clarified its
position that its model ethics codes allowed disclosure "only in the clear-
est cases" of illegality or fraud.38 Further, it asserted that, aside from the
ABA's model codes, only carefully considered federal legislation could
impose upon lawyers the duty to disclose client fraud to the SEC.39 Thus,
according to the ABA's own logic, even courts could not interpret ex-
isting federal securities laws as requiring such obligations of lawyers.40
In a bench trial, 41 the federal district court found that the lawyers had
indeed aided and abetted the securities fraud by acquiescing in the
merger.42 The court stated that these lawyers were "at the very least . . .
gates, 99 ANNUAL REPORT 151, 166 (1974) (reporting on the approval of an amendment to
DR 7-102(B)). Second, on September 30, 1975, the ABA published an official opinion,
which expanded on the 1974 amendment by prohibiting disclosure not only of privileged
communications but also of any other information gained "in the professional relation-
ship," disclosure of which "would be likely to be detrimental to the client." See Ronald D.
Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 OR. L. REV. 455, 469 n.67 (1984)
35. Id. at 469 n.69; see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 341 (1975).
36. Rotunda, supra note 34, at 469 (noting the effect of the ABA opinion on Model
Code DR 7-102(B)). One measure of the radicalness of this revision is that, despite years
of lobbying, only fourteen states adopted the ABA's drastic new change. Hazard, supra
note 26, at 29-54.
37. ABA Comm. on Counsel Responsibility & Liability of the Section of Corp., Bank-
ing & Bus. Law, Statement of Policy Adopted by American Bar Association Regarding Re-
sponsibilities and Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by
Clients with Laws Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 Bus. LAW.
543, 547 (1975) [hereinafter ABA, Policy Statement] ("The statutes administered by the
SEC give it no power to require disclosure by lawyers concerning their clients beyond what
is provided in the [Model Code].").
38. Id. at 547; see also id. at 545 ("[TJhe lawyer has neither the obligation nor the right
to make disclosure when any reasonable doubt exists concerning the client's obligation of
disclosure . . . .").
39. Id. at 544-45 ("[A]ny principle of law which, except as permitted or required by the
[Model Code], permits or obliges a lawyer to disclose to the SEC otherwise confidential
information, should be established only by statute after full and careful consideration of
the public interests involved, and should be resisted unless clearly mandated by law.").
40. See id. The ABA also warned of the possibility that a client's actions might be
"improperly narrowed through the insistence of an attorney" relying on a "known, but
perhaps erroneous, position of the SEC or a questionable lower court decision." Id. at 545.
41. Although both law firms and their respective partners participating in the merger's
closing were originally charged, by the time of the bench trial, everyone else, except for
LBB (counsel for Interstate), its two partners, and the former president and director of
Interstate, had either consented to the entry of final judgments of permanent injunction,
settled the case, or were otherwise dismissed. See SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F.
Supp. 682, 687 (D.D.C. 1978). Thus, the court was left with the unenviable task of ruling
solely on the conduct of the lawyers for Interstate (LBB), who were-as between the two
law firms-less actively involved in the fraud.
42. Id. at 687.
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required to speak out" to their clients in an attempt to stop them from
proceeding with the deal, noting that the lawyers' "silence . . . lent the
appearance of legitimacy to the closing." 43 However, the court disagreed
with the SEC's other allegations that issuing the opinion letter or failing
to take any remedial action after the merger constituted securities laws
violations. 44 In the court's view, the opinion "did not play a large part in
the consummation of the merger" but was "simply one of many condi-
tions to the obligation of NSMC to complete the merger." 45 This is not-
withstanding the court's own holding that mere silence constituted
"substantial" assistance of a securities violation.46
Having found the lawyers culpable, the court surprisingly declined to
sanction them 47 and concluded instead that "the violations proved by the
SEC appear to be part of an isolated incident, unlikely to recur and insuf-
ficient to warrant an injunction." 48 Thus, the SEC won only a formal
victory; the court granted no relief and never mandated any explicit duty
to notify the SEC or defrauded shareholders. 49
When we examine the bar's hostile reactions to the SEC's lawsuit, we
see the incipient notion of lawyer exceptionalism taking root. To support
the implicit claim that lawyers' function is unique and qualitatively differ-
ent from that of other gatekeeping professionals, lawyers (i) framed their
43. Id. at 713.
44. See id. at 714-15.
45. Id. at 714.
46. Id. at 713; Koniak, The Bar's Struggle, supra note 10, at 1252. Surely, if the lawyers'
"silence ... lent the appearance of legitimacy to the closing," Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp.,
457 F. Supp. at 713, then, a fortiori, the delivery of an opinion letter would do so as well.
The court seems to have understated the lawyers' role in this fraudulent transaction. As
noted by Morgan Shipman, the lawyer's opinion is the "passkey" to securities transactions.
Morgan Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of
Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 OHIo ST. L.J. 231, 267 (1973). "If [the
lawyer] judges that certain information must be included in a registration statement, it gets
included . . . ; if he concludes it need not be included, it doesn't get included." A. A.
Sommer, Jr., Comm'r, SEC, Address at the Banking, Corporation and Business Law Sec-
tion of the New York State Bar Association: The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securi-
ties Lawyer (Jan. 24, 1974), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1974/012474
sommer.pdf.
Indeed, few managers and few investment bankers would be so foolish as to proceed
with a transaction without their lawyers' green light. See Jonathan M. Barnett, Certification
Drag: The Opinion Puzzle and Other Transactional Curiosities, 33 J. CORP. L. 95, 127-29
(2007) (explaining the widespread use of opinions for significant transactions by noting the
opinion receiver's asymmetrical reputational incentives, whereby the receiver enjoys po-
tentially little reputational gains by closing a good transaction without incurring the costs
of obtaining a legal opinion but potentially suffers significant reputational harm by closing
what might turn out to be a bad transaction without a legal opinion).
47. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 716 (refusing the SEC's request for
injunctive relief).
48. Id.
49. Indeed, the court refrained from specifying any clear steps (such as resignation,
remedial action, or disclosure) that lawyers must take if their pleas are ignored. Id. at 713
("However, it is unnecessary to determine the precise extent of [lawyers'] obligations here,
since it is undisputed that they took no steps whatsoever to delay the closing pending
disclosure to and resolicitation of the Interstate shareholders.").
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role as "advocates" for their clients50 and (ii) distinguished their role
from that of auditors'.51 They argued that "public accounting firms re-
present themselves as independent entities on which the public can rely
for an objective evaluation of their clients' financial statements."5 2 Thus,
by implication, lawyers are seen as not performing any disinterested eval-
uation on which the public can (or should) rely. In fact, lawyers ridiculed
the notion that "law firms have the same public responsibilities as audit-
ing firms."53
To support the implicit claim that lawyers should be exempt from
gatekeeping obligations, lawyers noted that the lawyer-client relation-
ship, far from ordinary, is "of fundamental importance to our legal sys-
tem."54 Thus, the ABA insisted that lawyers should be free to advise "in
the client's best interest without conflicting loyalties or obligations."55
Accordingly, the ABA maintained that lawyers "cannot . .. be regarded
as a source of information concerning possible wrong-doing by clients." 56
In other words, imposing gatekeeping obligations would contravene the
special normative function that lawyers serve in our society.57
B. IN RE CARTER
While the National Student Marketing case was winding down, the
SEC's next big battle with the ABA was heating up. In 1979, the SEC
Enforcement Division switched from a civil enforcement strategy to initi-
ating a disciplinary proceeding under its longstanding power under Rule
2(e), now Rule 102(e),58 of its Rules of Practice 59 against two partners
50. See, e.g., Green, supra note 31 (reporting the general complaint by lawyers that the
SEC's action "threatens to make the lawyer a policeman instead of an advocate" and that
lawyers view themselves "first and foremost ... advocates for their clients' cause, not ...
representatives of the public."); ABA, Policy Statement, supra note 37, at 544 ("Any such
compelled disclosure would seriously and adversely affect . . . the ability of lawyers as
advocates to represent and defend their clients' interests."); Monroe H. Freedman, A Civil
Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 280, 288 (1974) (decrying the
SEC's actions and stating that "every lawyer is an advocate, irrespective of whether he or
she ever enters as courtroom"). To be fair, the ABA did concede that lawyers also function
as counselors. See ABA, Policy Statement, supra note 37, at 546 ("It is a basic principle that
the lawyer's role is essentially that of counselor to his client."). Over time, however, the
bar's rhetoric de-emphasized the counseling function.
51. Green, supra note 31.
52. Id.
53. Id.; see also William T. Coleman, Jr., The Different Duties of Lawyers and Ac-
countants, 30 Bus LAw. 91, 91 (1975) (criticizing the SEC's "attempt to try to equate the
lawyer to the public accountant").
54. ABA, Policy Statement, supra note 37, at 547.
55. Id. at 544.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 546 ("[A] role for the lawyer as investigator or informant would be a seri-
ously inconsistent one, and the Bar should critically scrutinize any proposal, however lim-
ited, that the lawyer can be so regarded.").
58. See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2009).
59. For the statutory authority of the SEC's Rules of Practice (including Rule 2) since
1935, see In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,847, at 84,149 & n.13 (Feb. 28,1981). The SEC's authority to promul-
gate Rule 2(e) has been affirmed by courts. See Implementation of Standards of Profes-
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from a major New York law firm, William R. Carter and Charles J.
Johnson.60
During the course of representing their client, the National Telephone
Company, Inc., Carter and Johnson learned that the CEO6 1 was publicly
releasing glowing financial reports that withheld material information, 62
including the fact that the company was on the brink of insolvency.63 Al-
though the lawyers repeatedly advised the CEO to rectify the fraud, they
were rebuffed each time.64 Nevertheless, the lawyers continued to assist
the CEO in preparing and filing deceptive public documents.65 They
never notified the board of directors66 and never withdrew their repre-
sentation.67 As a result, the company's public investors remained in the
dark until the company filed for bankruptcy.
The SEC charged the two lawyers with unethical or improper profes-
sional conduct and willfully aiding and abetting violations of the federal
securities laws within the meaning of Rule 102(e). 68 The Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) sustained the charges and suspended them from prac-
ticing before the SEC for one year and nine months, respectively.69
On appeal, the Commissioners of the SEC reversed the ALJ's decision
and dismissed the suit.70 While acknowledging that "[a]ssociation of a law
sional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8150, Exchange Act Release No.
46,868, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,829, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 & 71,671 & n.14
(proposed Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter SEC Initial Rule] (noting that "[elvery court that has
ever considered the issue has concluded that the Commission possessed the authority to
promulgate Rule 102(e) . . . to protect the integrity of its processes and to encourage pro-
fessionals to adhere to minimum standards of competence" and citing precedent).
60. Carter and Johnson were partners at the law firm of Brown, Wood, Ivey, Mitchell
& Perry. See In re Carter, 11981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1$ 84,146 &
84,152.
61. Sheldon L. Hart was National's founder, CEO, Chairman of the Board, controlling
shareholder, president, and treasurer. Id. 84,151.
62. Specifically, Hart refused to disclose a critical loan covenant that, if triggered,
would require National to wind up its operations. Id. 91 84,158-59. The agreement specifi-
cally provided that if (i) National attempted to borrow in excess of $19 million from the
existing creditor group, or (ii) National failed to meet a specified liquidity test, National
was required to implement the wind-down plan. Id. 1 84,158. Failure to implement the
wind-down plan would be an event of default under National's existing credit facility. Id.
63. Like many equipment leasing companies, National had a persistent cash-flow
problem that only worsened with the tightening credit markets. Id. $ 84,151. Most of
National's costs were installation expenses for new equipment leases, which were incurred
well before rental payments on those leases commenced. Id. Since rental payments were
National's only significant source of revenue, National's cash flow position continued to
worsen as the company entered into more leases and expanded its operations. Id.
64. See id. 91 84,154 & 84,157.
65. Id. 1 84,158. The final opinion of the Commissioners concluded that National's
disclosures clearly violated the federal securities laws. Id. T 84,165. Carter had revised a
December 1974 press release and prepared a contemporaneous Form 8-K, which were ma-
terially false and misleading. Id. Also, Carter and Johnson remained in "close and contin-
uing contact with the company," routinely advising Hart and receiving copies of National's
deceptive disclosures. Id. 1 84,153.
66. Id. 1 84,165.
67. Koniak, The Bar's Struggle, supra note 10, at 1257.
68. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 84,146.
69. Id. 1 84,146.
70. Id. T 84,146 & 84,173.
[Vol. 6384
Lawyer Exceptionalism
firm with a client lends an air of legitimacy and authority to the actions of
a client,"7' they concluded that the lawyers "did not intend to assist the
violation by their inaction." 72 In rejecting the AL's determination, they
found that the ALJ had improperly held the lawyers to a standard that
went beyond heretofore clearly established professional mandates.73
The Commissioners also announced their intention to solicit public
comment for a new standard for attorney professional conduct, which
they articulated as follows: 74
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the effectuation of
a company's compliance with the disclosure requirements of the fed-
eral securities laws becomes aware that his client is engaged in a sub-
stantial and continuing failure to satisfy those disclosure
requirements, his continued participation violates professional stan-
dards unless he takes prompt steps to end the client's
noncompliance.75
This new standard was intended to be a compromise. It was narrower
than the National Student Marketing standard because it excused those
lawyers lacking "significant responsibilities" for securities law matters
and triggered obligations only if the noncompliance amounted to a con-
tinuing pattern.76 Under this weaker standard, even Interstate's lawyers
in the National Student Marketing case may not have aided and abetted a
securities violation.77 In addition, the Commissioners declined to pre-
scribe what those "prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance"
should be,78 merely offering options to be considered and suggesting def-
erence to the lawyer (in the actual situation) who "is in the best position
to choose his next step."79 Most important, no longer was the SEC-
speaking through its Commissioners-insisting that lawyers had to report
out an unrectified violation to the SEC.80 And while the Commissioners
warned that continued involvement with a recalcitrant client may violate
professional standards, they clarified that there would be no blanket rule
requiring lawyers to resign.8 '
71. Id. 1 84,169.
72. Id.
73. Id. 84,170 (noting that the professional responsibilities of lawyers had "not been
so firmly and unambiguously established" that it was proper to hold these lawyers
accountable).
74. Id. 84,170 & 84,172.
75. Id. 84,172.
76. Koniak, The Bar's Struggle, supra note 10, at 1259.
77. COFFEE, supra note 5, at 211.
78. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,172 ("What is
required, in short, is some prompt action that leads to the conclusion that the lawyer is
engaged in efforts to correct the underlying problem, rather than having capitulated to the
desires of a strong-willed, but misguided client.").
79. Id.; Koniak, The Bar's Struggle, supra note 10, at 1259.
80. COFFEE, supra note 5, at 211.
81. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,172 (stating that
"[r]esignation is one option, although we recognize that other considerations, including the
protection of the client against foreseeable prejudice, must be taken into account in the
case of withdrawal," and disagreeing with the proposition that "resignation is the only
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Despite the new standard's relative toothlessness, the bar was again
outraged. In its 1981 official comment, the ABA noted that the SEC's
proposal had "generated widespread apprehension." 8 2 Notwithstanding
the SEC's citation of legal precedent affirming its authority to discipline
securities lawyers,83 the ABA insisted that there was no case law to sup-
port the SEC's power to promulgate practice standards for lawyers." It
also pleaded that self-regulation sufficed to control professional miscon-
duct,85 notwithstanding the fact that state bar discipline, particularly
against securities lawyers, is extraordinarily rare.86
Now more explicitly invoking lawyer exceptionalism, the ABA charac-
terized lawyers' role as unique.87 It stressed the "importance to society of
lawyers' unique professional obligations"88 as the basis for the legal pro-
fession's exemption from federal regulation. 89 It sharply contrasted the
lawyer's role with that of an auditor's and emphasized that lawyers have
an obligation of loyalty to clients, rather than independence from cli-
ents.90 The ABA argued that the adoption of the SEC's new standard
threatened to involve the SEC in "a hopeless morass" and warned that
going after lawyers would unwisely divert the SEC's "historically limited
resources."91 Barely veiling its contempt, the ABA derided the "notion
that the Commission has the power or responsibility to become a putative
bar association" 92 and invoked one of its central tenets-that state bar
authorities are the only bodies competent to regulate professional
permissible course when a client chooses not to comply with disclosure advice"). Under
classical gatekeeping theory, requiring gatekeepers to withdraw their cooperation is
viewed as the least burdensome of response duties that the law might prescribe. See
Kraakman, supra note 5, at 54 n.3.
82. ABA Section of Corp., Banking & Bus. Law, SEC Standard of Conduct for Law-
yers: Comments on the SEC Rule Proposal (Release No. 33-6344), 37 Bus. LAw. 915, 916
(1982) (reprinting the official comment).
83. In re Carter, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,147 (stating that
"[n]o court, having considered the question, has found the Commission not to have the
authority to adopt Rule 2(e)" and citing precedent).
84. ABA Section of Corp., Banking & Bus. Law, supra note 82, at 917.
85. See id. at 919-22.
86. State bar disciplinary systems lack both the funding and the expertise to go after
securities lawyers. See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 15, at 143-50; Roger C. Cramton et al., Legal
and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV 725, 730, 795-97
(2004); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589,
641 (1985); Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
6-8 (1991); David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 822-
30 (1992); Harvey L. Pitt, Chairman, SEC, Remarks Before the Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association's Business Law Section (Aug. 12, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch579.htm) (expressing the SEC's frustration about the
"generally low level of effective responses we receive from state bar committees when we
refer possible disciplinary proceedings to them").
87. See ABA Section of Corp., Banking & Bus. Law, supra note 82, at 923.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. (arguing against "[c]onscription of the legal profession" by the SEC and that
the lawyer-client relationship is not "well suited" for regulation by the SEC).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 923-24.




Not stopping there, in 1983, a reinvigorated ABA House of Delegates
adopted a new model ethics code, the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct (Model Rules), which recodified the 1974 "never disclose client
fraud" amendment to the Model Code.94 It did, however, add a caveat in
the official Comments-an "escape hatch" permitting withdrawing law-
yers to give third parties notice of withdrawal or to disaffirm tainted opin-
ions. 95 This escape hatch was adopted to enable lawyers to dissociate
themselves from ongoing client frauds, where there is an inherent risk of
lawyers being drawn into litigation for accessorial liability.96 In essence,
the ABA forbade lawyers from blowing the whistle but quietly gave them
permission to wave the red flag.9 7 Further, these same ABA delegates
"who waxed eloquent about the need to protect client confidences, ac-
cepted, without any debate," a provision "allowing the lawyer to breach
the confidence to collect his fee" even if no formal charges are filed.98
In the wake of this backlash, the SEC backed down again and let the
proposed rule "die a quiet death." 99 It apologized that it had neither the
"time [nlor expertise" to fashion guidelines for securities lawyers.'tm
93. See id. (noting that the SEC's interest in the conduct of corporate and securities
lawyers is "adjectival" and that "its expertise is lacking"); see David B. Wilkins, Making
Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1200
(1993) (identifying the tenet that state disciplinary agencies are the only competent agen-
cies to regulate professional conduct and arguing that this tenet is premised on faulty,
universalist "assumptions about the separation of 'ethics' from" all other "substantive"
areas of law).
94. See Koniak, The Bar's Struggle, supra note 10, at 1263, 1255-56.
95. Id. at 1263-64; see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 1.6 cmt. (1983)
("Neither this rule [1.6] nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the lawyer from giving
notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may also withdraw or disaffirm any opin-
ion, document, affirmation, or the like."); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 366 (1992) (reaffirming noisy withdrawal where the lawyer's "services or
work product are being used or are intended to be used by a client to perpetrate a fraud").
96. See Hazard, supra note 26, at 301-04; Rotunda, supra note 34, at 480-81. The risk
that lawyers would be drawn into litigation for aiding and abetting an offense is especially
acute where, for example, the lawyer's work product is used to perpetrate continuing
frauds. See Rotunda, supra note 34, at 480-81.
97. Id. at 484.
98. Id. at 471-72. For criticism of this exception to the duty of confidentiality, see
Hazard, supra note 26, at 288 (objecting not on grounds that the exception "illegitimately
protects lawyers, but that it protects only lawyers" who, as a result, are given "preferred
treatment among victims of the client's fraud" even though lawyers will typically "be in a
superior position to prevent the wrong"); Michael Seigel, Use of Privileged Information for
Attorney Self-Interest: A Moral Dilemma, 3 Bus. & PROF. Ermics J. 1, 8-10 (1983) (noting
that making exceptions for attorneys and not for others who are similarly situated violates
Kant's categorical imperative). The ABA also permitted the lawyer to reveal client confi-
dences to a court for the purpose of undoing a perjury. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) (1983).
99. Koniak, The Bar's Struggle, supra note 10, at 1260.
100. See Edward F. Greene, Gen. Counsel, SEC, Lawyer Disciplinary Proceedings
Before the Securities and Exchange Commission: Remarks to the New York County Law-




Chastened, the SEC basically stopped pursuing lawyers.' 0
To add insult to injury to the SEC's mission, in 1994 the U.S. Supreme
Court issued a decision that surprised even securities law experts.102 By a
five-to-four vote, the Court held in Central Bank of Denver v. First Inter-
state Bank of Denver that a private plaintiff could no longer maintain an
aiding and abetting lawsuit under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the prin-
cipal antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.103 In
so ruling, the Court departed from decades of judicial and administrative
precedent as well as the position of eleven courts of appeal.104
And while the SEC's authority to pursue aiders and abettors (including
lawyers and accountants) was legislatively reaffirmed the following
year, 05 Congress made it tougher for the SEC by raising the evidentiary
standard. For forty years, recklessness had been sufficient to establish
civil aiding-and-abetting liability.106 But Congress changed that standard
to the much more stringent requirement of knowingly providing substan-
tial assistance. 07 As a result, the SEC would not even touch the issue of
lawyer misconduct until the massive debacle known as Enron. 08
C. SARBANES-OXLEY Acr OF 2002
From the 1970s and 1980s, we now move to the more recent past. In
reaction to Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and other major scandals that
ushered in the new millennium, Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley. In
addition to ending the self-regulation of the accounting profession and
101. See Disciplinary Proceedings Involving Professionals Appearing or Practicing
Before the Commission, Exchange Act Release No. 25,893, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,427, at 26,431
n.31 (July 13, 1988) (noting that Rule 2(e) proceedings have been confined to disciplining
attorneys who already have been the subject of other judicial or administrative proceedings
involving violations of the securities laws); Robert W. Emerson, Rule 2(e) Revisited: SEC
Disciplining of Attorneys Since In re Carter, 29 AM. Bus. L.J. 156, 213 (1991) (noting that
almost all Rule 102(e) proceedings instituted against lawyers since In re Carter were
brought against defendants already found by federal courts to have violated securities
laws); Norman Johnson, Commissioner, SEC, Suits Against Lawyers, Speech Before the
ABA Federal Securities Law Committee (Nov. 8, 1996) (transcript available at http:// www.
sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1996/spchl37.txt.) (stating that "improper professional
conduct" by an attorney was a matter for state professional bodies to regulate and not the
SEC).
102. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Implications of Central Bank, 49 Bus. LAW. 1429, 1430
(1994) (noting that the outcome of the case was an "unexpected result").
103. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994).
104. Id. at 192, 201 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2006).
106. Cramton et al., supra note 86, at 829 n.408.
107. See 15 U.S.C. 78 t(e) (2006) ("[A]ny person that knowingly provides substantial
assistance to another person in violation of a provision of this chapter, or of any rule or
regulation issued under this chapter, shall be deemed to be in violation of such provision
108. See, e.g., SEC, STUDY AND REPORT ON VIOLATIONS BY SECURITIES PROFESSION-
ALS (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/sox703report.pdf (reporting that
between 1998 and 2001, only 49 lawyers out of 1,735 securities professionals were prose-
cuted by the SEC for both primary and secondary violations of the securities laws).
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authorizing rules to enhance the independence of securities analysts,109
Sarbanes-Oxley finally targeted lawyers and their complicity in corporate
frauds," 0 notwithstanding heated opposition from the ABA."'
Section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley delegated sweeping authority to the
SEC to promulgate "minimum standards of professional conduct" that
would enable it to discipline lawyers "appearing and practicing before the
Commission in any way in the representation of issuers."11 2 Specifically,
it ordered the SEC to implement a rule requiring lawyers who encounter
"evidence of a material violation" of law to report such evidence up the
corporate ladder to the full board or an appropriate committee thereof, if
necessary, to ensure that "appropriate remedial measures or sanctions"
are taken.113
Finally armed with explicit Congressional authorization, the SEC pub-
lished proposed rules for public comment on November 21, 2002.114 In
addition to a fairly elaborate internal up-the-ladder reporting protocol
designed to ensure that companies would appropriately address material
violations, this proposal included the infamous mandatory "noisy with-
109. Sarbanes-Oxley empowered the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board "to
oversee the audit of public companies . . . in order to protect the interests of investors."
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006). Sarbanes-Oxley also au-
thorized the SEC to engage in rulemaking designed to "address conflicts of interest that
can arise when securities analysts recommend equity securities . .. in order to improve the
objectivity of research." Id. § 78o-6(a).
110. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: Re-Situating the Inside Counsel as
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 984-85 (2005) (describing inside lawyers' implica-
tion in corporate frauds); Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Counseling, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1317, 1320 (2006) ("Lawyers have been implicated in almost all of the major health, safety,
and financial scandals of recent decades"). When Sarbanes-Oxley was being debated, law
firms representing Enron were facing lawsuits from Enron shareholders, who alleged that
the law firms were actively involved in transactions "designed to move debt off Enron's
books, inflate its earnings, and falsify Enron's reported financial results." See In re Enron
Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 657 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing
Consolidated Complaint for Violation of the Securities Law, Newby v. Enron Corp., No.
H-01-3624, (S.D. Tex. Apr. 8, 2002), 2002 WL 32597632 (naming Vinson & Elkins and
Kirkland & Ellis as defendants in the lawsuit)). Vinson & Elkins settled the case for $30
million. John C. Roper, Vinson & Elkins Settles with Enron for $30 Million, HoUSTON
CHRON., June 2, 2006, at Al. For an assessment of lawyers' role in Enron's transactions,
see generally Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139 (2005).
111. See Koniak, Corporate Fraud, supra note 10, at 220-21 (describing the ABA's lob-
bying efforts to derail Sarbanes-Oxley section 307); Letter from Robert D. Evans, Dir.,
Governmental Affairs Office of the ABA, to Senator Paul S. Sarbanes (July 19, 2002),
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/107thlbusiness071902.html (expressing
opposition to the House bill that became Sarbanes-Oxley section 307).
112. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). As further defined by the regulations, lawyers deemed to
be "appearing and practicing before the Commission" (and thus covered by Part 205) in-
clude all lawyers who communicate with the SEC, represent issuers in their dealings with
the SEC, or advise on matters pertaining to securities laws. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)(1)
(2009). Also, only attorneys for SEC-reporting companies are covered by the rule. See id.
§ 205.2(h).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006).
114. See SEC Initial Rule, supra note 59, at 71,670; see Implementation of Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 47,276, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6,
2003) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule].
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drawal" provisions as a backstop.115 Noisy withdrawal would be trig-
gered only if (a) the prescribed intra-corporate procedures proved
futilell 6 and (b) the lawyer "reasonably believe[d] that a material viola-
tion is ongoing or is about to occur and is likely to result in substantial
injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or of investors."" 7
In those circumstances, the lawyer would be required to (i) promptly dis-
affirm to the SEC any submissions "tainted" by a possible violation, (ii)
in the case of outside counsel, withdraw from representing the company,
and (iii) notify the SEC of the fact of her withdrawal "based on profes-
sional considerations." 18
Although this burden of reporting outside the corporation was miti-
gated by the rules in a number of significant ways,119 the bar was none-
theless aghast. An overwhelming majority of comment letters strongly
opposed the proposal. 120 The ABA warned that noisy withdrawal would
"risk destroying the trust and confidence many issuers have up to now
placed in their legal counsel, creating divided loyalties and driving a
wedge into the attorney-client relationship." 121 Comments maintained
that the SEC was forcing attorneys to function as "watchdog[s]"1 22 and
115. See SEC Initial Rule, supra note 59, at 71,681-82 (internal reporting); id. at 71,673
(noisy withdrawal).
116. Specifically, noisy withdrawal obligations would only apply when the client's high-
est authority fails to respond appropriately or timely to the lawyer's up-the-ladder report
of evidence of a material violation. See id. at 71,674.
117. Id. at 71,688. "Material violation" means a "material violation of the securities
laws, a material breach of fiduciary duty, or a similar material violation." Id. at 71,679. The
final rules made cosmetic modifications to this definition. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i) (2009).
118. SEC Initial Rule, supra note 59, at 71,688.
119. First, noisy withdrawal would not be mandated if the material violation had al-
ready occurred and had no ongoing effect. See id. at 71,690; id. at 71,674 (clarifying that in
the case of a past material violation that has no ongoing effect, the attorney is "permitted,
but not required, to take these steps, so long as he or she also reasonably believes that the
reported material violation is likely to have caused substantial injury to the financial inter-
est of the issuer or of investors") (emphasis added)). Second, withdrawal would not be
required for in-house counsel, who would still have to disaffirm the relevant documents. Id.
at 71,688-89. Third, lawyers representing companies that had adopted a "qualified legal
compliance committee" to handle these reports were exempted from mandatory noisy
withdrawal, and these companies would be subject to an altogether different procedure. Id.
at 71,687-88.
120. Indeed, I could not locate a comment letter from a major law firm that was sup-
portive of mandatory noisy withdrawal. Comment letters supportive of the SEC's proposal
were typically submitted by non-lawyers, including law professors, engineers, and-occa-
sionally-solo practitioners. For description of my methodology, see infra note 146. See
also Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities and
Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79, 120
(2005) (noting the "multitude of negative comments," which resulted in the SEC "cut[ting]
back on its proposal and extend[ing] the comment period on the 'noisy withdrawal'
provisions").
121. Letter from the ABA to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/apcarlton1.htm [hereinafter Letter from the
ABA].
122. Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y,
SEC (Dec. 17, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/elmilonasl.htm
[hereinafter Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2002)] ("[T]he proposed
rules .. . assign a 'watchdog' function to attorneys . ... [A]ttorneys are required to report
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that by "requiring attorneys to police and pass judgment on their cli-
ents,"1 23 the SEC was transforming the lawyer from trusted counselor to
policeman.124 The bar claimed that the proposed rule was tantamount to
compelling lawyers to reveal client confidences. 125 It had somehow for-
gotten that the ABA itself had created the very procedure of noisy with-
drawal and-since at least 1983-strongly suggested that it would not
constitute disclosure. 12 6 The SEC's original proposal was so broadly de-
nounced by the bar that the SEC quickly backed down.
On January 29, 2003, the SEC published its final regulations under Part
205,127 which omitted mandatory noisy withdrawal and replaced it with a
less onerous, discretionary external reporting provision 128-one that rep-
the misconduct of others even where the attorney played no role in any of the actions that
led to the violation.").
123. Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/sullivancl.htm [hereinafter Letter
from Sullivan & Cromwell].
124. Letter from the Am. Corp. Counsel Ass'n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec.
18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/bnaglerl.htm (noting that
the proposed rules "take an unprecedented and unnecessary step toward changing the role
of a corporate lawyer from one of a trusted legal counselor to one of a whistle-blowing
policeman").
125. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RE-
SPONSIBILITy 53 n.94 (2003), reprinted in 59 Bus. LAw. 145, 173 n.94 (2003) ("Providing
notice to the SEC that the attorney has withdrawn 'for professional considerations' and
disaffirming specific documents will have a similar effect as a violation of client confidences
. . . ."); Letter from the Comm. on Prof'I Responsibility & Conduct, State Bar of Cal., to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pro-
posed/s74502/copracsbcO40403.htm ("The Commission rules requiring or permitting disclo-
sure of corporate secrets outside the corporate structure, however, will necessarily subvert
and turn on its head the relationship of trust between client and lawyer.").
126. The only plausible and internally consistent way of reading the text of Model Rule
1.6 and its comment (which allows for noisy withdrawal) is for noisy withdrawal to not
constitute disclosure of confidential information. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.6 cmt. 14 (2002) ("Neither this Rule [1.6] nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents
the lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal...."); id. R. 1.16 cmt. 3 ("The court
may request an explanation for the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep
confidential the facts that would constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement
that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily
should be accepted as sufficient."); id. R. 1.16 cmt. 3; Hazard, supra note 26, at 301-04;
Koniak, The Bar's Struggle, supra note 10, at 1270.
127. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 205.1-.7 (2009). These regulations became effective on
August 5, 2003. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct, Securities Act Re-
lease No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47, 276, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6320 (Feb. 6, 2003).
128. Under the finally adopted permissive external reporting provision, the lawyer is
now allowed to "reveal to the [SEC], without the issuer's consent, confidential information
related to the representation" under certain circumstances. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2) (2009).
Those circumstances are:
(i) To prevent the issuer from committing a material violation that is likely to
cause substantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or
investors; (ii) To prevent the issuer, in [an SEC] investigation or administra-
tive proceeding from committing perjury . .. or committing any act . . . that is
likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the [SEC]; or (iii) To rectify the conse-
quences of a material violation by the issuer that caused, or may cause, sub-
stantial injury to the financial interest or property of the issuer or investors in
the furtherance of which the attorney's services were used.
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licated the disciplinary rule already in effect in most state jurisdictions. 129
At the same time, the SEC issued an alternative second proposal cover-
ing only mandatory external reporting,130 which fared no better than the
original proposal.13'
Since the conclusion of the notice-and-comment rulemaking, the SEC
has exchanged fire with two state bar associations that had openly flouted
the SEC's authority to adopt Part 205 (notwithstanding Sarbanes-Oxley
section 307).132 While all of this was happening, the ABA revised its
Model Rules to expand the lawyer's discretion to disclose. 133 After the
Part 205 regulations were enacted, the ABA published a carefully crafted
statement asserting that "lawyers for the corporation . . . are not 'gate-
keepers' of corporate responsibility in the same fashion as public ac-
Id. Alternative reporting procedures apply to companies which had adopted qualified le-
gal compliance committees (QLCCs). See id. § 205.3(c); see also id. § 205.2(k) (defining
QLCC).
129. Note, Developments in the Law: Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2227, 2242 (2004). As of 2004, "[t]hirty-seven states [permitted] disclosure to prevent a
crime, while an additional four require such disclosure." Id. That said, only a minority of
jurisdictions "allow[ed] disclosure to mitigate the effects of a past crime or fraud commit-
ted using the lawyer's services." Id. at 2242-43 (emphasis added).
130. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 8186, Exchange Act Release No. 48,282, Investment Company Act
No. 25,920, 79 SEC Docket 1392 (Jan. 29, 2003). This alternative proposal, which was never
adopted, basically shifted the onus of reporting the fact of the lawyer's mandatory with-
drawal to the company, rather than the reporting lawyer. See id.
131. For much of the bar, the alternative proposal was just as bad as the original one
because it had the same effect of eroding clients' willingness to confide in counsel. See, e.g.,
Letter from 79 Law Firms to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 7, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/79lawfirms1.htm [hereinafter Letter from 79
Law Firms] ("We believe that as a practical matter the chilling effect on the attorney-client
relationship of a required notice of attorney withdrawal to the Commission will be equally
adverse, whether that notice is required to be given by the issuer or by the attorney."); Letter
from the N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 1, 2003),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/edrobertson1.htm [hereinafter Let-
ter from the N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n] ("Whether the reporting obligation is placed on
the lawyer or on the client is immaterial to the fact that it is the reporting obligation itself
that threatens to erode the candor required for meaningful attorney-client communica-
tions to transpire."); Letter from Debevoise & Plimpton to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC
(Mar. 31, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/debevoisel.htm
[hereinafter Letter from Debevoise & Plimpton] (noting that the proposed alternative ap-
proach creates the same fundamental problems as the original proposal by "causing issuers
not to consult counsel").
132. See Cramton et. al, supra note 86, at 799-808 (describing the SEC's stand-off with
the Washington and California state bar associations, which challenged portions of Part
205). For an analysis of the preemption issues, see, for example, id. at 788-98; Sara Levy,
The SEC, The States and Attorney Conduct Rules: An Analysis of Preemption Issues, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1681, 1702-15 (2004).
133. After vociferous debate in its House of Delegates, the ABA adopted revisions to
two of its rules expanding the lawyer's discretion to report internally to higher authorities
and externally under certain circumstances. Cramton et. al, supra note 86, at 731-33; Kim,
supra note 110, at 1039-53; Note, supra note 129, at 2234-36. The amendment to Rule
1.6(b) (Confidentiality of Information) passed by a vote of 218 to 201, and the amendment
to Rule 1.13 (organizational client) passed by a vote of 239 to 147. 2003 Annual Meeting,
DAILY J. (ABA House of Delegates, San Francisco, CA), Aug. 11-12, 2003, at 13, available
at http://www.abanet.org/leardershipl2003/2003journal.pdf.; see Cramton et al., supra note




Since 2003, the SEC has ramped up its enforcement efforts against law-
yers, although most (if not all) of its actions have been based not on Part
205, but on legal principles that pre-dated Sarbanes-Oxley.x35 In the
meantime, the securities bar continues to denounce the SEC for pursuing
lawyers who are merely "engaged in what lawyers do," as if to suggest
that lawyers should be immune from liability so long as their complicity is
via "legal services."' 36 On the legislative front, on July 30, 2009, Senator
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, spurred by the lingering anger over Wall
Street, introduced a bill that would effectively reverse the U.S. Supreme
Court's Central Bank of Denver'37 decision.138 And in a brief filed on
August 6, 2009, the SEC argued that law firms should be held primarily
liable for knowingly providing false and misleading statements in com-
pany's public disclosures. 139 As of this writing, the SEC has not revisited
the third rail that is mandatory noisy withdrawal. 140
II. LAWYER EXCEPTIONALISM
Even this condensed history of the gatekeeping wars reveals the appeal
to "lawyer exceptionalism." As noted by David Wilkins, "one of the legal
profession's most important constitutive beliefs [is] that it is a single pro-
fession bound together by unique and specialized norms and practices
134. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON CORPORATE RE-
SPONSIBILITY, supra note 125, at 22.
135. Keith L. Kearney et al., Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the Underwriting Process, in
How TO COMPLETE YOUR SECURITIES OFFERINGS ON A TIMELY BASIS 2008, at 337, 341,
350 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 13,988, 2008).
136. See, e.g., David B. Bayless, Recent SEC Enforcement Actions Against In-House
Lawyers: Its Impact on Legal and Compliance, in INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 2008: LEGAL,
ETHICAL & STRATEGIC ISSUES 665, 670, 676 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Hand-
book Ser. No. 14541, 2008) ("[Llawyers, when engaged in what lawyers do, should not
normally be the subject of enforcement actions.. . . Even assuming the SEC's allegations
are true . . . , the type of conduct that those in-house lawyers engaged in is the type of
conduct that lawyers typically undertake. . .. It is unusual, to say the least, for these types
of actions to be the subject of an SEC enforcement action for securities fraud."). The impli-
cation that lawyers should be exempt from liability for providing legal assistance flies in the
face of principles of tort, agency and criminal law, which do not excuse lawyers whose
assistance furthers illegality. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a Lawyer Go in
Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 669, 680 (1981).
137. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994). See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
138. See Liability for Aiding & Abetting Securities Violations Act of 2009, S. 1551,
111th Congress (2009); Ameet Sachdev, Senator, SEC Hope to Pierce Shield Protecting
Lawyers, CHICAGO TRIB., Aug. 11, 2009, at 17.
139. The SEC stated that a third party also may be primarily liable if the entity provides
the false or misleading information that another person puts into a false statement. Brief
for the SEC, Amicus Curiae, in Support of the Position of Plaintiffs-Appellants on the
Issue Addressed and in Support of Neither Affirmance nor Reversal at 6, Pac. Mgmt. Co.
v. Mayer Brown LLP, No. 09-1619-cv (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2009).
140. An important outcome in this battle is that the SEC even declined to mandate that
lawyers and their law firms withdraw from representation. Under classical gatekeeping the-
ory, requiring gatekeepers to withdraw their cooperation from wrongdoers is considered
the least burdensome of response duties that the law may prescribe. See Kraakman, supra
note 5, at 54 n.3.
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distinct from the norms and practices of lay people."141 More specifi-
cally, in my view, lawyer exceptionalism contains both descriptive and
normative components. As a descriptive matter, lawyer exceptionalism
claims that lawyers have a societal function that is unique and qualita-
tively different from that of other professionals, such as accountants, who
have legal obligations to avert fraud.14 2 As a normative matter, lawyers'
function is so valiant, virtuous, and beneficial that lawyers should be free
to perform it without constraints imposed by the state.14 3 In sum, lawyer
exceptionalism maintains that the special nature of lawyers' role merits
special treatment-namely, that lawyers should be exempt from obliga-
tions imposed by authorities outside of the legal profession, including the
SEC. 144
Again, my goal here is not to appraise the merits of regulating securi-
ties lawyers. Instead, my project is more sharply delimited to analyzing
the rhetoric of lawyer exceptionalism, how it functions, and why it seems
141. Wilkins, supra note 93, at 1148.
142. Assuming the role of the modern priesthood, the legal profession has long claimed
its uniqueness. For recent examples, see, for example, Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of
the City of N.Y. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/abcnyO4O7O3.htm [hereinafter Letter from the Ass'n of the
Bar of the City of N.Y. (2003)] ("[I]t would be difficult for issuers to have confidence that
their communications with their attorneys would remain sacrosanct." (emphasis added));
Letter from the Corps. Comm., Bus. Law Section, State Bar of Cal., to Giovanni P. Prezi-
oso, Gen. Counsel, SEC (Aug. 13, 2003) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from
the Corps. Comm., Bus. Law Section, State Bar of Cal.] ("[L]awyers . .. play a unique and
often pivotal role under the Federal securities laws."); Letter from Erik N. Frias to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pro-
posed/s74502/enfrias040703.htm (noting the "sacrosanct .. . confidences between an attor-
ney and his client" in arguing against the SEC's proposed rules); Letter from the L.A.
County Bar Ass'n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.
sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/maronil.htm [hereinafter L.A. County Bar Ass'n] ("Law-
yers have a special and unique role in our society . . . ."). These assertions of uniqueness
are consistent with the rhetoric of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr pmbl. (2002) ("The legal profession is largely self-
governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government,
the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship between the
profession and the processes of government and law enforcement." (emphasis added)).
143. Voices from the bar insist that lawyers should not be regulated or subject to disci-
pline by the SEC. See, e.g., Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2003),
supra note 142 ("The SEC, as a prosecutorial body, should not regulate the attorneys who
are defending cases brought by the [SEC]."); Letter from the ABA, supra note 121 (argu-
ing for "avoidance of the chilling effect on zealous representation that can arise from law-
yers being subject to threat of enforcement by the very regulatory agency before which
they must advocate on behalf of their clients"); Letter from 77 Law Firms to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/77
lawfirmsl.htm [hereinafter Letter from 77 Law Firms] ("We are also concerned the explicit
or implicit threat of enforcement of 'ethics' rules by the [SEC] staff could chill a lawyer's
energetic representation of his or her client . . . ."). Against the background of lax enforce-
ment from state bar disciplinary authorities, this effectively translates into an argument
that securities lawyers should be left unregulated. See supra note 86 and accompanying
text.
144. The assertion of lawyer exceptionalism to stave off external regulation should not
be surprising in light of Rick Abel's observation that "all professions proclaim their distinc-
tiveness and justify their privileges by insisting on their unique qualifications to regulate
themselves." ABEL, supra note 15, at 8.
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persuasive enough to invariably resurface in the gatekeeping wars. To do
so, in terms of method, I go beyond the classical rhetorical analysis found
in argumentation textbooks. Since at least the 1980s, cognitive scientists
have deepened rhetorical analysis by providing a rich framework for
parsing persuasion.14 5 Accordingly, I rely on insights from cognitive sci-
ence that sharpen lay intuitions about how rhetoric works.
Further, in terms of object of study, I focus most closely on the official
comments filed during the SEC's notice-and-comment rulemaking pro-
cess in connection with the Part 205 regulations implemented under sec-
tion 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley.14 6 These filings represent the most recent
and significant clash in the gatekeeping wars between the bar, 47 and the
SEC. Moreover, the rhetoric of these comments is consistent with (and
thus representative of) the rhetoric of prior battles. 1 4 8 Until now, no le-
gal scholar has systematically reviewed these comments.
A. CONTRAST EFFECT
As noted above, the descriptive prong of lawyer exceptionalism claims
that lawyers have a societal function that is unique and qualitatively dif-
ferent from that of other professionals, such as accountants, who have
legal obligations to avert fraud. The persuasiveness of this claim does not
hinge so much on carefully reasoned and defended argument; instead, it
taps into default, culturally supplied categorical thinking about lawyers.
Let me motivate this approach with a vignette:
A father and his son are out driving. They are involved in an acci-
dent. The father is killed, and the son is in critical condition. The
145. See generally George Lakoff, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor, in META-
PHOR AND THOUGHT 202 (Andrew Ortony ed., 2d ed. 1993); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN,
FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987);
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
146. On its website, the SEC listed 252 official comments to the Part 205 proposals.
Due to errors on the website, only 243 of the comments were actually available for
download. First, I personally reviewed all the major comment letters-those submitted by
large clusters of law firms, bar associations, and individual law firms who are reputable in
the field of securities practice in an effort to understand the types of arguments commonly
asserted by the bar. Second, two student research assistants coded the comment letters for
the specific types of arguments made (e.g., lawyer as "zealous advocate," SEC as "prosecu-
tor," or contrasting lawyers with auditors). Finally, I downloaded the comments into a
database, which allowed me to conduct targeted text search queries.
147. For simplicity, I will often refer to the view from "the bar" or "the legal profes-
sion" to represent what I have found to be the dominant voice that has emerged within the
legal profession to fend off external regulation by the SEC. At the same time, I acknowl-
edge that there is, of course, no monolithic view from the bar and that our legal profession
is composed of heterogeneous communities of lawyers with competing normative visions.
See, e.g., Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal
Ethics Code, in LAWYERS' IDEALs/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 140 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (noting the "heter-
ogeneity of ethical views" within the legal profession); Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers:
The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 96-109 (2006)
(identifying the anti-tax shelter faction of the tax bar).
148. In addition, the exemplars of rhetoric are well-defined and finite. Also, the filing




son is rushed to the hospital and prepared for the operation. The
doctor comes in, sees the patient, and exclaims, "I can't operate, it's
my son!"149
Who's the doctor?
When this question was posed in a 1972 study by Larry Gorkin, only
eighteen percent of the subjects could answer it, even though virtually all
of them self-identified with feminist values. 150 Most subjects were flum-
moxed and could not see that the doctor was the son's mother. Why did
an overwhelming majority fail to provide the simplest explanation to this
problem? The answer lies in the cognitive science of categorical thinking.
Since the 1970s, advances in the fields of cognitive psychology, cogni-
tive linguistics, artificial intelligence, and anthropology have provided a
compelling account of the internal structure of categories.15' Whenever
we think about categories, we actually tend to home in on a representa-
tive instance of the category. For most important categories, our minds
have constructed a "prototype," or mental model of a category member
with its attendant attributes, to stand in for the category.152 These stable
149. Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1113-14 (2004); Steven J.
Sherman & Larry Gorkin, Attitude Bolstering When Behavior Is Inconsistent with Central
Attitudes, 16 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 388, 391 (1980).
150. Sherman & Gorkin, supra note 149, at 391 (citing Larry Gorkin, The Sensuous
Doctor: The Response to Sex-Role Logic Problems (1972) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the State University of New York at Stony Brook)).
151. See infra notes 152-55 and accompanying text.
152. In short, a prototype is the cognitively "best example" of a category. For many
categories, the category's prototype will contain a set of attributes, abstracted from experi-
ence, that reflect the "central tendency" (e.g., the average, median, or modal values on
various dimensions) of the category members. See Lawrence W. Barsalou, Ideals, Central
Tendency, and Frequency of Instantiation as Determinants of Graded Structures in Catego-
ries, 11 J. EXPERIMENTAL PsYcHoL. 629, 630 (1985) (noting two possible interpretations of
the "family resemblance" model and arguing that determining family resemblance through
comparisons to central tendencies may be more plausible, given limited cognitive
resources).
To be sure, prototype theory is not the only theory of categorical processing. As re-
search in cognitive psychology progresses, new findings invariably foster the evolution of
our models of categorization. For example, in some contexts we rely on exemplars-spe-
cific concrete instances of category members as distinguished from a unitary prototype
abstracted from experience, as well as implicit or explicit theories about the causal rela-
tionship of an attribute to a category and the purpose of a category, to assist our everyday
classification. ZIVA KUNDA, SOCIAL COGNITION: MAKING SENSE OF PEOPLE 37 (1999).
The emerging consensus in cognitive psychology favors a mixed model of prototypes and
exemplars-guided by theories-which are either activated, applied, or even suppressed
depending on the context. See SUSAN T. FisKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNI-
TION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 101 (2008) ("People rely on a mixture of representations
. . . ."); KUNDA, supra, at 31-32 ("Most recent reviewers of the relevant research have come
out in favor of a mixed model .... ); Gregory L. Murphy & Douglas L. Medin, The Role
of Theories in Conceptual Coherence, 92 PSYCHOL. REv. 289, 300 (1985); see also FISKE &
TAYLOR, supra, at 98, 101-02 (describing various conditions affecting "category activa-
tion"). In my judgment, because the social category of "lawyer" is a culturally familiar one
for most people, prototypes, rather than exemplars, are likely to be activated. That said,
whether we envision abstracted prototypes or concrete exemplars doesn't matter much for
purposes of this Article. In addition, I am not arguing that the cognitive phenomena de-
scribed in this Article are the exclusive cognitive phenomena taking place in the gatekeep-
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mental models are adaptive: they simplify and streamline our perception
process 53 and define our expectations, which then enables us to act in a
purposive manner.154
But they also sometimes disserve us, as in the case of the female doctor
problem. When thinking through the category of doctors, the prototype
of a male doctor was activated for many of us. Put another way, we tend
to perceive the male doctor as the "best example" or most cognitively
accessible instance of the category of doctors. Although we all intellectu-
ally understand that women can be doctors, the prototype of the male
doctor was too powerful to override for many of us.
In my view, categorical thinking is at the heart of the bar's rhetoric of
lawyer exceptionalism. After all, the descriptive claim that lawyers are
unique is nothing more than a claim that the category of lawyers does not
overlap with the category of gatekeepers. As I demonstrate below, the
bar's rhetoric primes the litigator as the prototype for lawyers; con-
versely, the rhetoric primes the auditor as the prototype for gatekeepers.
Because the litigator seems so disparate from the auditor, a contrast ef-
fect155 is created, which makes us think that lawyers are unlike gatekeep-
ers. The consequence is to bolster the bar's descriptive claim that lawyers
are one-of-a-kind.
1. Lawyer as "Litigator"
When we think about the category of lawyer, which instance-or pro-
totype-comes to mind? Is it a trust and estates lawyer, a tax lawyer, a
patent lawyer, or perhaps a trial lawyer? Which prototype comes to mind
depends, of course, on various factors.156 What I seek to demonstrate
here is that when we think of the category of lawyer, the litigator most
likely comes to mind. This happens by default because the litigator is
chronically accessible' 57 in our culture. Additionally, in this regulatory
context, the bar's rhetoric specifically primes158 this figure.
ing wars; rather, I am merely asserting that these cognitive phenomena are meaningful in
the gatekeeping wars.
153. C. Neil Macrae & Gail V. Bodenhausen, Social Cognition: Thinking Categorically
About Others, 51 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 93, 95-96 (2000).
154. Id. at 94.
155. For a definition of "contrast effect", see infra note 227 and accompanying text in
Part II.A.3.
156. More precisely, the prototype activation is conditionally automatic. See Macrae &
Bodenhausen, supra note 153, at 98-102. The relevant conditions include: the perceiver's
attentional resources, temporary processing goals, chronic accessibility, category salience,
and, for social categories, general attitudes toward members of the category in question.
See id.
157. A concept that is "chronically accessible" is one that easily comes to mind at all
times. See KUNDA, supra note 152, at 24. For example, "honesty" and "friendliness" are
trait dimensions that are chronically accessible by Americans because they are culturally
favored. FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 152, at 30.
158. "[P]riming refers to any experiences or procedures that bring a particular concept
(or any other knowledge[] structure) to mind." KUNDA, supra note 152, at 22.
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Prototypes are often constructed out of the most typical'5 9 members of
the category. Although litigation itself is steadily diminishing in its signif-
icance, there's some reason to think there are more lawyers who regard
themselves as litigators than not.160 If so, the central tendency (or the
average, median, or modal values on various dimensions) of category
members may be the litigator.
Regardless of the actual numbers, the prototype of litigator is so fre-
quently primed by our environment that it's chronically accessible. This
is a feature of American history, 161 which provides iconic lawyers in the
form of "great courtroom warriors," such as Daniel Webster, 162 John Ad-
ams,163 Clarence Darrow,'" Abraham Lincoln,165 and Thurgood Mar-
shall.166 Modern popular legal culture1 67 is obsessed with television
shows featuring litigators in plotlines, like L.A. Law, Law and Order, Ally
McBeal, and The Practice, and critically acclaimed films such as Kramer
vs. Kramer,168 The Verdict,169 Philadelphia,170 and Erin Brockovich.171
159. See Eleanor Rosch & Carolyn B. Mervis, Family Resemblances: Studies in the In-
ternal Structure of Categories, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 573, 602 (1975) ("The more proto-
typical a category member, the more attributes it has in common with other members of
the category . . . .").
160. See JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
THE BAR 42 (2005). This recently published study of the Chicago bar does not categorize
lawyers into litigators versus non-litigators but does differentiate practitioners by fields to
which they have devoted at least five percent of their work. Id. Just counting those practi-
tioners who report practicing "business litigation" and "general litigation" already gives us
a figure of fifty percent of lawyers in the Chicago bar who may identify themselves as
"litigators." Id.
161. Until the development of the major industrial economy in the late 19th century,
lawyers were almost exclusively litigators or, more precisely, trial lawyers. Lawrence M.
Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1601 (1989).
162. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 303-33 (Simon &
Schuster 1985) (1973).
163. See Anthony Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Review of Mass Media Por-
trayals of American Attorneys, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 281, 282 (1986) (noting John
Adam's defense of the British soldier who gave the order to fire that precipitated the
Boston Massacre of 1770).
164. Clarence Darrow was the main defense attorney in the historic 1925 "Scopes Mon-
key Trial" in Dayton, Tennessee. See Douglas D. Linder, State v. John Scopes ("The Mon-
key Trial"), http://www.lawumkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scopes/evolut/htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2010). The film Inherit the Wind (1960) is a fictionalized account of the trial. See
PAUL BERGMAN & MICHAEL Asimow, REEL JUSTICE: THE COURTROOM GOES TO THE
MOVIES 74-79 (2006).
165. Mark E. Steiner, A Docket That Reflects Then and Now, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2009, at
39.
166. David B. Wilkins, From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good for
Business": The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the Fate of the Black Corpo-
rate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548, 1548-51 (2003).
167. Friedman, supra note 161, at 1580 (positing two definitions of "popular legal cul-
ture," the second of which includes "books, songs, movies, plays and TV shows which are
about law or lawyers, and which are aimed at a general audience").
168. KRAMER Vs. KRAMER (Columbia Pictures 1979).
169. THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982).
170. PHILADELPHIA (TriStar Pictures 1993).
171. ERIN BROCKOVICH (Universal Studios, Columbia Pictures 2000).
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For these reasons, the litigator prototype is by default what's in the air.172
This default prototype should not be different for experts. From the
first day of law school, the expert-in-training is encouraged to adopt the
litigator's partisan perspective.173 Professional conduct codes-written
by experts for experts-give prominence to the role of the litigator.174
Legal ethics scholars, such as Daniel Markovits, Monroe Freeman, and
172. See also Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. Dise. RESOL. 7, 7 (noting
that, after consuming popular culture, which depicts the trial as a "central pivot of the
American legal process," visitors from Mars might be "incredulous" if told that "the trial is
rapidly disappearing from the American legal scene"); Marc Galanter, The Hundred- Year
Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1255, 1255 (2005) (observing
that the "image of law in public consciousness is centered on the trial," even though there
is abundant evidence that the number of trials is shrinking).
173. As Gary Blasi notes, our legal education system is predicated on "unstated and
generally unexamined assumptions" about lawyering, including the notion that "a lawyer is
a litigator, very likely a trial lawyer, knowledgeable about both legal doctrine and proce-
dure, and able to put that knowledge to use on behalf of an individual client, generally in a
fairly simple dispute with another party." Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers Know: Lawyering
Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL EDuc. 313, 324-25
(1995). The dominant law school pedagogy is the case method and not the deal or even
problem method. A plethora of courses are devoted to procedural law or skills more rele-
vant to litigators (civil procedure, evidence, federal courts, conflicts of laws, legal writing,
trial advocacy) rather than transactional lawyers. See Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popu-
lar Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 85, 93-94 (1994) (noting
law schools' focus on the adversary system and the justiciable "case," a "controversy
marked by zealous arguments"). Law students generally tote around casebooks filled with
judicial opinions-not dealbooks filled with term-sheets, contracts, or prospectuses. At
most law schools, first year law students are required to participate in mock appellate argu-
mentation. Later on, students spar in national moot court competitions. Even beyond law
school, litigation remains highly salient. All law school graduates take the multi-state bar
examination, which tests six subjects, only two of which would be associated with the typi-
cal knowledge base of non-litigating lawyers. See National Conference of Bar Examiners:
The Multi-State Bar Examination, http://www.ncbex.org/multistate-tests/mbe/ (last visited
Feb. 17, 2010) (2006) (stating that the Multi-State Bar Examination tests contracts, real
property, torts, constitutional law, criminal law, and evidence). Once admitted to the
state's bar, a certificate issued by the state's highest court is promptly delivered to the
newly minted lawyer, even though-during that lawyer's entire career-she may never
have any contact with any court (except for jury duty).
174. See, e.g., Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REv. 1385, 1454 n.527 (2004) ("All nine rules in Section 3 [Model
Rules 3.1 through 3.9] of the Model Rules ('Advocate') are devoted to litigation issues.");
Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice As A Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REv. 255, 278
(1990) ("[Tlhe ABA's [Model Rules] were drafted (largely upon the insistence of the trial
bar) to give primacy to the advocate's role . . . ."); James W. Jones, Future Structure and
Regulation of Law Practice: An Iconoclast's Perspective, 44 ARIz. L. REv. 537, 541 (2002)
("[W]e have effectively adopted the English barrister as the paradigmatic model for the
regulation of law practice in this country"); Re, supra note 173, at 115 ("Codes of profes-
sional ethics and responsibility have traditionally been designed primarily for litigators.");
Milton Regan, Jr., Professional Responsibility and the Corporate Lawyer, 13 GEo. J. LE-
GAL Em-ics 197, 200 (2000) (noting that ethical rules "have been formulated primarily
with the litigator in mind"); Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability
of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669, 672 (1978) ("Although the [Model Code] recognizes to a
larger extent than did the [Canons], which preceded it, that all lawyers are not constantly
litigating, the advocate's role is still clearly the axis of the Code." (internal citations omit-
ted)); Wilkins, supra note 93, at 1152 (noting that virtually all of the principles contained in
the 1908 Canons of Ethics "convey[ed] the impression that most lawyers spent most of
their time in court, or, alternatively, that the ethics of litigation were equally applicable to
other areas of legal practice" and that the 1969 Model Code made "few distinctions be-
tween different legal tasks, such as litigation and counseling"). The emphasis on the litiga-
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Lawrence Fox, model lawyers' norms based on the ethic of adversary ad-
vocacy to the virtual exclusion of all other roles.175 Even Supreme Court
Justices privilege the litigator's advocacy function when referring to the
role of lawyers generally.176
This default representation is further primed by the specific language
used in the bar's official comments to the SEC's Part 205 proposals. The
comments repeatedly use the terms "advocate" or "zealous advocate" to
refer to lawyers generally and "advocacy" or "zealous advocacy" as rep-
resenting the core function or attribute of lawyers.177 For example, ac-
tor's role is disproportionate to the significance of litigation in modern practice. See supra
note 172.
175. See DANIEL MARKOVITs, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICs: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN
A DEMOCRATIC AGE 3-4, 13-17 (2008) (noting that the ethic of adversary advocacy re-
quires that "lawyers must lie" and "lawyers must cheat"). See generally id. at 25-99 (Part I:
Adversary Advocacy). For a critique of Markovits's modeling, see Ted Schneyer, The
Promise and Problematics of Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View, 16 YALE J. L.
& HUMAN. 45, 58-60 (2004) (criticizing Markovits for both overstating the adversary obli-
gations of litigators and treating litigators as representative of the legal profession gener-
ally). For a reply, see Daniel Markovits, Further Thoughts About Legal Ethics From The
Lawyer's Point of View, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 85, 101-111 (2004); and see also MONROE
H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 13-43 (3d ed. 2004);
Freedman, supra note 50, at 288 (decrying the SEC's actions and stating that "every lawyer
is an advocate, irrespective of whether he or she ever enters as courtroom"); and Lawrence
J. Fox et. al, Historical Preface, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 691, 693 (1998) (noting that lawyers
"are zealous advocates first and foremost"). None of this is to deny that advocacy is a
component of the lawyers' role.
176. In the 1984 case of United States v. Arthur Young, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
the argument asserted by the accounting firm, Arthur Young, that an auditor's workpapers
should be protected from a summons by the Internal Revenue Service on the basis of an
accountant's qualified work-product immunity. 465 U.S. 807, 817-18 (1984). The Supreme
Court noted that:
The Hickman work-product doctrine was founded upon the private attor-
ney's role as the client's confidential advisor and advocate, a loyal represen-
tative whose duty it is to present the client's case in the most favorable
possible light. An independent certified public accountant performs a differ-
ent role. By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a corpora-
tion's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public
responsibility transcending any employment relationship with the client ....
This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client ....
Id.
By expressly referring to the lawyer as the "client's ... advocate" and describing the
lawyer's job as "present[ing] the client's case in the most favorable possible light," the
Supreme Court clearly privileges the advocacy function of litigators. See id. at 817. Also,
by describing the accountant's role in "certifying the public reports," the Court privileges
the auditor's functions of disinterested evaluation and certification. See id. at 817-18.
Thus, on the issue of whether concerns about client candor should trump disclosure obliga-
tions, the Court's disparate treatment of lawyers and accountants is ultimately grounded in
the prototypes of the litigator engaged in advocacy and the auditor engaged in disinterested
evaluation and certification.
177. Of the 243 comments made publicly available electronically, only 123 were submit-
ted by lawyers writing in their capacity as lawyers. Since I relied on the comments to
ascertain the view of the bar, I generally excluded comments filed by clients (corpora-
tions), even though they may have been authored by in-house counsel, because they also
reflected the perspective of a purchaser of legal services (in addition to the perspective of a
provider of legal services). Of these 123 comments, 43% featured the text string "advo-
cate" or its variants (searched via using the root "advoc"), and 24% featured the term
"zealous." See SEC, Comments on Proposed Rule: Implementation of Standards of Pro-
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cording to the law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell:
An attorney's principal obligation, both to the client and to the pub-
lic interest, is to be a zealous advocate for his or her client within the
bounds of the law. Issuers are likely to have concerns about the abil-
ity of counsel to advocate their interests before the [Securities & Ex-
change] Commission zealously and within the bounds of the law
when counsel himself or herself could become a target, or threatened
target, of the Commission.178
The law firm Jones Day states unequivocally, "Attorneys are advo-
cates." 179 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, whose
members practice in the largest securities law firms, writes that "[tihe at-
torney's role is to serve as the issuer's advocate"s 0 and that they have a
"mandate . . . [to] zealously represent their clients."18 The comment let-
ter from a group of 77 Law Firms, including such elite securities firms as
Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Sullivan & Cromwell; and Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, contains an entire section entitled "The Effect on Advo-
cacy. "182 The American Bar Association worries that "exposure to third
party liability could have a chilling effect on a lawyer's ability to act solely
in the interest of and zealously advocate for a client."' 83
Once a concept, such as "advocate," is activated by semantic stimuli,
the associated cognitive concepts residing in our long-term memory are
rendered more accessiblel 84 through a process called "spreading activa-
tion."185 For example, when I say "hospital," you should be able to more
quickly recall "nurse," "drugs," and "illness."1 86 Which conceptual nodes
are connected to "advocate" and "advocacy"? Although no experiments
are directly on point, everyday linguistic practices provide some clues.
Consider, first, a dictionary definition of an advocate: "1: one that
pleads the cause of another; specif: one that pleads the cause of another
before a tribunal or judicial court <the [advocate] for the defense>."'87
fessional Conduct for Attorneys, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.shtml (last vis-
ited Feb. 17, 2010). To be sure, a few law firms displayed a more nuanced view of the role
of lawyers. See, e.g., Letter from Clifford Chance to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec.
18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/clifford2.htm ("A corpo-
rate or securities lawyer is primarily an advisor to a company. A lawyer who represents a
company in connection with an investigation or litigation is an advocate for the com-
pany."). That said, virtually all law firms opposed anything resembling noisy withdrawal.
178. Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 123 (emphasis added).
179. Letter from Jones Day to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 7, 2003), available at
http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jonesday040703b.htm [hereinafter Letter from Jones
Day].
180. Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2003), supra note 142.
181. Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2002), supra note 122.
182. Letter from 77 Law Firms, supra note 143.
183. Letter from the ABA, supra note 121.
184. Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra note 153, at 96.
185. See Galen V. Bodenhausen & C. Neil Macrae, Stereotype Activation and Inhibi-
tion, 11 ADVANCES IN SOCIAL COGNITION 1, 14-17 (1998); Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra
note 153, at 96, 115.
186. Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra note 153, at 96.
187. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 18 (10th ed. 1996) (emphasis added).
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The concepts of "plead[ing]," "tribunal," "court," and "defense" are
tightly connected with litigation and the litigator. In sharp contrast, non-
litigating lawyers, such as business lawyers, do not generally handle justi-
ciable controversies and have little contact with "judges" or "courts."' 88
Indeed, business lawyers' disconnection from the paradigm of adjudica-
tive proceedings may explain why lawyers, legal scholars, and lay folk
alike have trouble articulating what it is that business lawyers actually
do.189
188. See, e.g., John Flood, Doing Business: The Management of Uncertainty in Lawyers'
Work, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 41, 67 (1991) (noting that advocacy consumes little of the
business lawyer's time and that "corporate lawyers hardly ever enter a courtroom").
189. See, e.g., Gary A. Munneke, Lawyers, Accountants, and the Battle to Own Profes-
sional Services, 20 PACE L. REv. 73, 75-76 (1999); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Profes-
sional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice
Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1981) (noting bar associations' difficulty in defin-
ing the "practice of law" outside of litigation practice in a way that distinguishes the work
of lawyers from other professionals and noting that some jurisdictions simply note that the
practice of law is "what lawyers do").
Legal scholars have proffered many complex and diverse explanations about what busi-
ness lawyers actually do, almost none of which highlight the role of "advocacy." See, e.g.,
Louis M. BROWN, PREVENTIVE LAW (1950); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL
ETHics § 13.2.3, at 690-91 (practitioner's ed. 1986) (discussing preventive law); Louis M.
Brown, The Law Office-A Preventive Law Laboratory, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 940, 940
(1956) (noting that business lawyers practice preventive law); Yves Dezalay, The Big Bang
and the Law: The Internationalization and Restructuration of the Legal Field, 1 THEORY,
CULTURE & Soc'Y 279, 279-93 (1990); Flood, supra note 188, at 42 (noting that business
lawyers are engaged in "managing uncertainty for both their clients and themselves");
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation By Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) (noting that business lawyers engineer transaction costs);
Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private Lawmaking, 18
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 423, 423 (1993) (describing business lawyers as "legal entrepre-
neurs"); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 679,683 (1996)
(describing business lawyers' role in suppressing business disputes as business facilitators).
To be clear, I am not as interested in this Part in what business lawyers actually do as
much as our understanding of what business lawyers do. Stated another way, I am not
contesting the proposition that business lawyers occasionally engage in conduct that bears
some resemblance to the advocacy of litigators (although legal scholarship's overwhelming
emphasis on the non-advocacy aspects of the business lawyer's role suggests that advocacy
is not a prominent facet). I easily concede that when business lawyers negotiate opposite
sides of a transaction, such as a buy-sell agreement, they often stake out adversarial posi-
tions on their clients' behalf. Nonetheless, there are good reasons why we linguistically
refer to such conduct as "negotiations," rather than "advocacy." First, ordinary agents-
such as real estate agents-also engage in negotiations, and yet we don't normally refer to
realtors' work as "advocacy." Thus, "advocacy" is insufficiently descriptive. Second, there
are fundamental differences between litigators' advocacy and the purported "advocacy" of
business lawyers. For example, in pre-contractual deal negotiations, most of the conflicts
negotiated by business lawyers are not justiciable. If buyer and seller cannot reach an
agreement on price, which seller's representations or warranties are to be included in the
agreement, the form of consideration, or which closing documents are to be delivered, that
is usually the end of the matter: if they fail to agree, their non-agreement is usually non-
litigable. In other words, the deal just "dies." See Schwartz, supra note 174, at 676. Third,
even where the conduct of business lawyers and litigators most overlap (for example, busi-
ness lawyers' deal negotiations and litigators' settlement negotiations), there are still fun-
damental differences. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation:
Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 637 (1976) (distinguishing be-
tween negotiations to settle disputes that "have arisen out of past actions" and negotiations
that establish "rules to govern future conduct"). Further, I am also not contesting the
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Consider, next, the linguistic practice of self-description. The ABA
Section of Litigation unequivocally describes its mission as "dedicated to
helping litigators become more effective advocates for their clients."190
In sharp contrast, business lawyers typically refer to themselves as "advi-
sors" or "counselors."'91 Indeed, the self-described mission of the ABA
Section of Business Law is to "serve the public, the profession and the
Section." 192 Notice that the terms "advocate" or "advocacy" appear no-
where in the Business Law Section's mission statement.
Finally, it's fascinating how the comments often activate a particular
subset of litigator-the criminal defense lawyer. For instance, the Associ-
ation of the Bar of the City of New York writes:
[T]he proposed noisy withdrawal and related requirements place the
SEC, which is a prosecutorial agency, in the extraordinary and anom-
alous position of regulating the counsel of its adversaries. .... "The
SEC is frequently and quite properly the adversary of private citi-
zens. In those circumstances, private citizens turn to lawyers to re-
present them and advocate their case to the SEC, before the SEC
and, if necessary, against the SEC in court proceedings."19 3
Although the SEC performs many functions, including rulemaking, mar-
ket oversight, adjudication, and enforcement, and does refer criminal
cases to the U.S. Department of Justice for prosecution, the above quota-
proposition that business lawyers practice "in the shadow of law," or act with the purpose
of minimizing adverse legal outcomes in potential litigation. See Robert H. Mnookin &
Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979). But, again, real estate agents also practice in the shadow of the
law, and yet, we rarely refer to their work as "advocacy." (Indeed, every person poten-
tially acts in the shadow of the law in the sense that he or she acts with the intention to
avoid legal liability, some persons being more informed or adept than others.) My main
point here is that, given preconceived notions about advocacy and our nebulous under-
standings about what business lawyers actually do, when the bar says "advocate" to denote
"lawyer," it is the litigator, rather than the business lawyer, who comes to mind. Also,
based on my ten years of practice experience as a business lawyer, I cannot recall a single
moment when a transactional colleague or I described ourselves as advocates. For the
most part, transactional lawyers tend to classify one another as either deal-makers or deal-
breakers. See infra notes 213, 308.
190. See ABA, Section of Litigation, http://www.abanet.org/litigation/about/ (last vis-
ited on Jan. 30, 2010) (emphasis added).
191. COFFEE, supra note 5, at 193 (noting that corporate lawyers do not view them-
selves as "embattled advocates" but as "wise counselors"). More entrepreneurial business
lawyers may eschew professional monikers in favor of characterizing their work as that of
"business service providers who sell specialized legal-financial services to customers."
Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer-A Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some
Basis in Reality, 50 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 1169, 1203 (2009).
192. The ABA Section of Business Law states:
The Mission of the Section is to serve the public, the profession and the Sec-
tion by furthering the development and improvement of business law, edu-
cating Section members in business law and related professional
responsibilities, and helping Section members to serve their clients compe-
tently, efficiently and professionally.
ABA, Business Law Section, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/home.shtml (last visited on
Feb. 17, 2010).
193. Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2003), supra note 142 (quot-
ing Richard Hall, Why the SEC is Unfit to Regulate Lawyers, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 2002,
at 16, 16 (emphasis added)).
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tion selectively emphasizes the SEC's role as a "prosecutorial agency"194
and "adversary of private citizens." Accordingly, the lawyer's role is
carefully framed as safeguarding private interests: "[P]rivate citizens turn
to lawyers to represent them and advocate their case to the SEC . . . in
court proceedings."s9 5 These framings activate the criminal defense con-
text rhetorically, even though the SEC's Part 205 regulations specifically
exempt criminal defense representation.19 6
If the litigator is chronically accessible (as I have argued), then the sub-
type of the criminal defense lawyer is particularly salient and accessible in
our culture. 197 Television and film often invoke the "archetypal positive
image" of the criminal defense lawyer: "a protector who stands with his
or her client against all the world no matter what the odds."198 Obvious
examples come to mind: Perry Mason,199 Atticus Finch in To Kill A
Mockingbird,200 Daniel Kaffee in A Few Good Men,201 or Jake Brigance
in A Time to Kill.2 0 2
While categories are often represented by typical instances, categories
may also be represented by an ideal instance-especially if the category
itself is perceived as being imbued with an intrinsic purpose. 203 In our
society, a widely shared view of the purpose of lawyers is to defend their
clients against adversaries and, in particular, the state. And what instance
of lawyer most completely and vividly fulfills that purpose? The criminal
defense lawyer. As such, the criminal defense lawyer, a subset of liti-
gators, may in fact be the cognitively "best example" of lawyer.
194. Of the 123 comments submitted by lawyers, see supra note 177, 24% featured the
text string "prosecute" or its variants (searched via using the root "prosecut.").
195. Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.(2003), supra note 142.
196. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
197. Friedman, supra note 161, at 1599 (noting that the criminal defense lawyer receives
"good press" while others are "dismissed as mountebanks").
198. Chase, supra note 163, at 282.
199. As noted by Lawrence Friedman, in Perry Mason, "almost every episode featured
a criminal trial." Friedman, supra note 161, at 1600 n.39. See Chase, supra note 163, at
282, for a survey of portrayals of American attorneys in mass media.
200. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal International 1962); see BERGMAN &
Asimow, supra note 164, at 17-20.
201. A FEw GOOD MEN (Columbia Pictures 1992); see Chase, supra note 163, at 286-90.
202. A TIME To KILL (Warner Bros. 1996); see BERGMAN & Asimow, supra note 164,
at 250-53. To be sure, since the 1970s, there has been a rising tide of negative media depic-
tions which, no doubt, reflect growing popular animus against lawyers, including criminal
defense lawyers. See Michael Asimow, Bad Lawyers in the Movies, 24 NOVA L. REv. 533,
536 (2000). But even in those accounts, many of the crooked lawyers happen to be liti-
gators. For example, Liar, Liar (Universal Pictures 1997) and The Devil's Advocate
(Kopelson Entertainment 1997) depict morally bankrupt litigators. Of course, The Firm
(Paramount Pictures 1993) is one famous counter-example of morally bankrupt tax law-
yers. Id. at 534-35.
203. See, e.g., LAKOFF, supra note 145, at 87-88 (noting the relevance of ideals in cultur-
ally significant categories and paragons); Barsalou, supra note 152; Russell C. Burnett et
al., Ideal Is Typical, 59 CANADIAN J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3 (2005); William F. Chap-
lin et al., Conceptions of States and Traits: Dimensional Attributes with Ideals As Proto-
types, 54 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 541, 553 (1988); Elizabeth B. Lynch et al., Tall
Is Typical: Central Tendency, Ideal Dimensions, and Graded Category Structure Among
Tree Experts and Novices, 28 MEMORY & COGNITION 41 (2000).
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The activation of the criminal defense lawyer and its associated net-
work of concepts is evidenced in the bar's frequent assertions of the right
to "effective" or "independent" counsel.204 Here, of course, "indepen-
dence" means independence from the state. The ABA writes:
A core principle of our democratic values is the right of everyone,
including organizations, to representation by independent counsel of
their choice to advise and protect against adversarial actions, espe-
cially those of governmental agencies. To ensure that independence,
lawyers need to be able to act in the best interests of the client with-
out self interest or concern over the lawyer's personal exposure to
civil liability.205
In a similar vein, the State Bar of California makes more explicit refer-
ences to the right to criminal defense representation under the Sixth
Amendment:206
The importance of the assistance of counsel is grounded on common
law principles and reflected in the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution (as to criminal trials). . . . When an agency with enforcement
authority, such as the SEC, promulgates rules that weaken the confi-
dential and fiduciary relationship between counsel and client, the
agency necessarily interferes with the attorney-client relationship and
the client's right to effective assistance of counsel.207
Both implicit and explicit references to the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel for criminal trials208 are striking in light of the fact that the Sixth
Amendment only attaches to criminal prosecutions, 209 which are ex-
204. See, e.g., Letter from 77 Law Firms, supra note 143, at 6 ("[Tlhe explicit or implicit
threat of enforcement of 'ethics' rules by the [SEC] staff could ... endanger[ ] the right to
effective counsel."); Letter from the N.C. Bar Ass'n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Jan.
21, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/jnpruden1.htm [hereinafter Let-
ter from the N.C. Bar Ass'n] ("Every issuer is entitled to representation by counsel that
will act in its best interests.").
205. Letter from the ABA, supra note 121 (emphasis added).
206. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . .. to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONsT. amend.
VI.
207. Letter from the Corps. Comm., Bus. Law Section, State Bar of Cal., supra note 142
(emphasis added). This quotation comes from a letter submitted by the State Bar of Cali-
fornia after Part 205 was enacted. See id. The letter protested the permissive noisy with-
drawal provision and questioned the SEC's very authority to enact Part 205. See id.
208. See, e.g., Letter from the Corp., Fin., & Sec. Law Section of the D.C. Bar to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502/dcbarl.htm [hereinafter Letter from the Corp., Fin., & Sec. Law Section of the D.C.
Bar] ("[Tihe SEC rules would deny clients the right to counsel in criminal matters, a right
recognized by the Sixth Amendment and repeatedly affirmed by the courts."); Letter from
Foley & Lardner to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Mar. 20, 2003), available at http://sec.
gov/rules/proposed/s74502/kbwinerl.htm (suggesting that the rule "den[ies] clients of their
right to effective assistance of counsel .. . [and] would raise serious constitutional ques-
tions"); Letter from the N.C. Bar Ass'n, supra note 204 ("Criminal lawyers are not re-
quired to withdraw from representation of a client that has indicated it has committed an
offense.").
209. See Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Tex., 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2594 (2008) (Roberts, J.,
concurring) (clarifying that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists to protect the
accused in his defense at trial and "not defense in relation to other objectives that may be
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pressly exempted from the Part 205 reporting obligations. 210 But, more
important to my argument, these Sixth Amendment references suggest
that the type of lawyer the comments have in mind is the criminal defense
attorney-a type of litigator.211
At this point, knowledgeable readers are likely to object, "Wait! Law-
yers aren't only zealous advocates. They're also officers of the court.
And they certainly do much more than litigate or defend. You're just
painting a caricature!" I couldn't agree more. I know it's a caricature,
but it's not one that I am making up: it's a caricature already in our heads.
My point here is that the bar's rhetoric takes full advantage of that fact.
I am not here interested so much in what lawyers actually do as much
as our conventional understanding of what lawyers do.2 1 2 In this Part, my
goal is merely to establish the operation of a specific cognitive phenome-
non: the implicit, automatic activation of concepts that start from the trait
of "zealous advocate" and end up at the prototype of the "litigator." The
fact that this may be imprecise or overstated on the merits says nothing
about whether our implicit cognitions nevertheless occur in this manner.
It's no different from pointing out that people hold stereotypes even
though they're not well founded.213
important to the accused" and citing precedent); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
689 (1984) (noting that the purpose of the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of effective assis-
tance of counsel "is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial"). Moreo-
ver, the Sixth Amendment is temporally constrained. In an eight-to-one decision, the
Supreme Court held that a "criminal defendant's initial appearance before a judicial of-
ficer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks
the start of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel." Rothgery, 128 S. Ct. at 2592 (majority opinion).
210. See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
211. This is not the place to challenge the uncritical transposition of criminal defense
representation (comprising an estimated three percent of legal practice) to all contexts in
which lawyers practice, as others have supplied critiques. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 160,
at 42 tbl.2.1 (reporting that 3% of total legal effort is devoted to criminal defense and that
41 out of 675 lawyers surveyed (or 6% of those lawyers) devote at least 5% of their work
to criminal defense). For critiques, see, for example, Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for
Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1204-07 (2003);
Rhode, supra note 86, at 606 (criticizing the bar's individualist claims, which are "heavily
parasitic on the criminal defense role"); Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advo-
cate, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 543, 544 (arguing that the criminal trial cannot serve as
the model of the adversary system or of the behavior of advocates in the civil trial).
212. See supra note 189.
213. To be clear, I am not arguing that only litigators who are involved in formal adjudi-
cative proceedings are engaged in advocacy. After all, when lawyers publicly answer me-
dia charges or engage in political lobbying efforts on behalf of their clients, they appear to
be engaged in a form of advocacy outside the traditional adjudicatory context. See Michele
DeStefano Beardslee, Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Installment One: Broaden-
ing the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL Enics 1259, 1310 (2009). I am also
not arguing that only lawyers engage in advocacy. We all know that political lobbying is a
form of advocacy that is often practiced by non-lawyers. See Michael L. Stern, Ethical
Obligations of Congressional Lawyers, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 191, 205-06 (2007).
Indeed, there are aspects of the business lawyer's practice that resemble the advocacy of
litigators. See supra note 189. My only point here is that, for various reasons, we tend to
cognitively associate the term "advocacy" or "zealous advocacy" with litigators (and not
business lawyers), which in turn renders the bar's claims persuasive to many listeners. But
it is also my view that when the bar stretches the definition of "zealous advocacy" to en-
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In sum, by hammering on the notion of "zealous advocate," the bar
activates the prototype of "litigator" (even "criminal defense lawyer").
This in turn triggers a cascade of associated concepts. At the same time,
alternative conceptual networks are actively suppressed through "spread-
ing inhibition."2 1 4 In the end, when we think of the category of lawyer,
we privilege the instance of litigator and the attendant attribute of zeal-





(especially against the state)
2. Gatekeeper as "Auditor"
Now consider the category of gatekeepers. It's safe to say that popular
culture does not provide any strong default prototype since the category
is unfamiliar to most people. But what about the bar's rhetoric? What
prototype does it prime? Although various instances of "gatekeeper" are
offered,215 such as "policeman," 216 "field agent," 217 "reporter," 218 "inves-
tigator,"219 and "judge," 220 the prototype most frequently activated is the
compass virtually all activities undertaken by all lawyers, the bar unwittingly undermines
its own descriptive claim that lawyers are unique. After all, many of those functions per-
formed by many lawyers are also performed by non-lawyers. Accordingly, "advocacy" in-
sufficiently describes the work of lawyers. See supra note 189 and infra note 308.
214. See Macrae & Bodenhausen, supra note 153, at 102; Bodenhausen & Macrae,
supra note 185, at 8-10.
215. The comments often do not explicitly talk of "gatekeeper" (only four percent of
the comments submitted by lawyers explicitly mention "gatekeeper"). But they gesture to
a superordinate category that is not explicitly articulated but includes the likes of police-
men, judges, and auditors.
216. See, e.g., Letter from the Comm. on Sec. of the Bus. Law Section of the Md. State
Bar Ass'n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (March 31, 2003), available at http://sec.gov/
rules/proposed/s74502/adpoliakoffl.htm [hereinafter Letter from the Comm. on Sec. of the
Bus. Law. Section of the Md. State Bar Ass'n] ("The practical effect ... is to put the
attorney in the role of a policeman . . . ."); Letter from the Chi. Bar Ass'n to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502.htm
[hereinafter Letter from the Chi. Bar Ass'n] (warning that the lawyer would be in the
"position of auditor or policeman" and serve "as the [SEC]'s field agent").
217. Letter from the Chi. Bar Ass'n, supra note 216.
218. See, e.g., Letter from the Am. Corp. Counsel Ass'n to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y,
SEC (Apr. 7, 2003) (expressing concern that the proposed regulations would turn the law-
yer into a "cop[] on the beat" or "reporter" or "policeman for the government").
219. See, e.g., Letter from the Bar Ass'n of S.F. & the Beverly Hills Bar Ass'n to
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s74502/ctbradford1.htm (pointing out that Part 205 goes beyond the mandate of Sarbanes-
Oxley section 307, which "does not require the attorney to act as an investigator or police-
man"); Letter from Jones Day, supra note 179 ("[B]y requiring mandatory [noisy] with-
drawal . . . . Section 3(d) would effectively make attorneys watchdogs or investigators
required to second guess a client's decisions . . . .").
220. Letter from the Chi. Bar Ass'n, supra note 216 (fearing that the lawyer would
become a "judge of no recourse," "auditor or police officer").
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auditor. 221 No doubt, this is in part because the auditor is both plausible
and context-relevant. After all, the SEC has no regulatory authority over
cops, journalists, or judges; by contrast, it specifically regulates auditors, a
subset of accountants.
Take, for instance, the following representative comment from the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York:
Attorneys act as advocates and advisors to their clients. Unlike ac-
countants, their role is not to "attest" to information, "certify" infor-
mation or vouch to the public. Nor are they employed to enforce the
law or regulations governing their issuer clients. Unlike an auditor
whose very role is to be skeptical and utterly independent, an attorney
acting as an advocate must be able to make full use of the attor-
ney-client privilege (consistent with the crime-fraud exception) to
make effective and zealous advocacy possible. Despite this basic un-
derstanding of the attorney's role, the proposed rules attempt to
transform attorneys into investigators of their clients, and put attor-
neys in the impossible position of simultaneously acting as advocates
and unilateral judges of even past misconduct by the issuer and
whistleblowers, rendering practically impossible the mandate that at-
torneys must zealously represent their clients. 222
The above excerpt explicitly mentions "auditors." Notice the emphasis
on attestation and certification, 223 both of which require the disinterested
evaluation of the company. The concepts of attesting, certifying, as well
as impartially evaluating (suggested by the terms "skeptical and utterly
independent [from the client]," "investigators," and "judges") fall nicely
within the same activated network centering on the prototype of the audi-
tor. Notice also how attorneys (framed as "advocates") are viewed as not
possessing those particular attributes.
The following comment from the Maryland State Bar Association high-
lights the role of the auditor and, more explicitly, the function of disinter-
ested evaluation:
[T]he role of the auditor is clearly that of an objective assessor who
determines the accuracy and adequacy of the financial statements;
the auditor, therefore, must be independent to be objective. On the
other hand, the attorney is the advocate for the client (i.e., to defend
his or her client zealously), not the independent auditor.224
221. Of the 123 comments submitted by lawyers, 39% featured the text string "auditor"
or "accountant." See supra notes 146 and 177 for a description of my methodology.
222. Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2002), supra note 122 (em-
phasis added).
223. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(2), (2)(a) (2006). Under current law, auditors are instructed to
investigate their clients' financial statements for the purpose of certifying to the investing
public that the audit was conducted in accordance with GAAS and that the financial state-
ments fairly and accurately represent the company's condition in accordance with the stan-
dards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006).
224. Letter from the Comm. on Sec. of the Bus. Law Section of the Md. State Bar
Ass'n, supra note 216.
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Notice the activated concepts that all center on the prototype of the audi-
tor: "objective assessor," "accuracy . . . of financial statements," and "in-
dependent." By contrast, the lawyer is framed as the "advocate for the
client" with the lawyer's function of zealous defense highlighted.
Finally, consider the priming by 79 Law Firms in their comments. They
note expressly that:
[A] public accountant for an issuer (i) is required to be independent
(as defined at great length and in considerable detail), (ii) audits an
issuer's financial statements, (iii) reports on the results of the audit to
the issuer's shareholders and (iv) is relied on by the investing
public.225
Yet again, the prototype of the auditing accountant is activated. Yet
again, the attribute emphasized is that the auditors "report" auditing re-
sults that must be trustworthy so as to be "relied" upon by the public.
Here also, the "public" nature of auditing is emphasized to be sharply
contrasted with the presumed "private" nature of lawyering.






Above I've made the case that the bar's rhetoric primes the prototypes
of the litigator and auditor to represent the categories of lawyers and
gatekeepers, respectively. And for the litigator, the crucial representative
attribute is zealous advocacy. As for the auditor, the representative at-




Attribute Zealous advocacy Disinterested evaluation
(especially against the Certification
state)
Comparing these prototypes side-by-side leads to what cognitive psychol-
ogists call the "contrast effect." The contrast effect is a bias that leads
perceivers to exaggerate the differences between two instances presented
225. Letter from 79 Law Firms, supra note 131.
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together unless the instances "are very similar to each other."226
Much of the evidence for the contrast effect comes from studies exam-
ining the categorization of borderline instances, or target instances that
lie near the border of two categories. The typical experimental paradigm
takes two extremes, such as a male and female face, and morphs the
images together to create a composite image, such as an androgynous
face, that sits in the middle of the spectrum between the extremes.227
Then scientists ask subjects to judge whether the borderline image be-
longs in either of the two extreme categories. 228 For example, scientists
ask subjects to determine the gender of an androgynous face that is a
50:50 composite of the male and female face.2 2 9 Strikingly, the same
morphed face is more likely to be judged female after being exposed to
the original male face; conversely, the exact same composite is more
likely to be judged male after exposure to the original female face.230 In
other words, subjects are biased in favor of finding a contrast.231 Numer-
ous other experiments employing colors, audio tones, and morphed
images of cat and dog have confirmed this basic cognitive tendency.2 32
With this rudimentary understanding of the contrast effect, consider
the simultaneous activation of the litigator on the one hand and the audi-
tor on the other. The contrast effect predicts that the juxtaposition of the
litigator and auditor will lead perceivers to exaggerate their differences
and think of them as belonging to separate categories; in short, the litiga-
tor now seems oppositional to the auditor. Since litigator and auditor
psychologically represent their respective categories (lawyer and gate-
keeper), there is a further consequence: the entire category of lawyers
comes to seem nothing like the entire category of gatekeepers.
Schematically, the phenomenon looks like this:
226. James A. Hampton et al., Comparison and Contrast in Perceptual Categorization,
31 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1459, 1466 (2005) (making this point with respect to experi-
ments on context and target hues).
227. See J. Friedenberg et al., Priming and Perception of Androgynous Faces: What You
See Is Not What You Get, Poster Presentation at the Forty-Third Annual Meeting of the
Psychonomic Society, Kansas City, Mo. (2002) (copy of research on file with author).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.; Hampton et al., supra note 226, at 1460-61.
231. There is also a weaker bias called the "assimilation effect," which occurs when a
target instance "is more likely to be included in the category of the context" instance.
Hampton et al., supra note 226, at 1460-61. The assimilation effect is likely to occur if the
target instance is already very similar to the context instance. Id.
232. Id. at 1470-71.
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Rhetorically, we see lawyers taking advantage of this contrast effect in
comments such as these:
* "[t]he attorney-client relationship is different than the auditor-client
relationship . . . ."233
* "Accountants ... are in no way analogous to lawyers who render
securities advice to public companies." 234
* "[T]he roles of independent public accountants and attorneys are
very different." 235
* "[L]awyers and accountants play fundamentally different roles under
the federal securities laws." 236
* "[T]here is no valid analogy that warrants regulating attorneys simi-
larly to independent public accountants." 2 3 7
* "[T]he analogy [with auditors] is fatally flawed." 238
In sum, when we think about lawyers, we are primed to think of the
prototype of litigator. When we think about gatekeepers-or some pro-
fessional who should be averting fraud-we are primed to think of the
prototype of auditor. These cognitions, both latent in our culture and
primed by the bar's rhetoric, lead us effortlessly to think that lawyers and
gatekeepers are separate and independent categories. The practice of
lawyering thus appears fundamentally inconsistent with the practice of
gatekeeping.
233. Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2003), supra note 142 (em-
phasis added).
234. Letter from the N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, supra note 131 (emphasis added);
accord Letter from the L.A. County Bar Ass'n, supra note 142 ("Attorneys do not have
duties to the public like those of accountants in certifying financial statements.").
235. Letter from 79 Law Firms, supra note 131.
236. Letter from the Fed. Regulation Comm. of the Sec. Indus. Ass'n to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec'y, SEC (April 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/frc-
sia040703.htm [hereinafter Letter from the Fed. Regulation Comm. of the Sec. Indus.
Ass'n].
237. Letter from 79 Law Firms, supra note 131.
238. Letter from Debevoise & Plimpton, supra note 131 ("It may be argued that audi-
tors of issuers are required . . . to notify the [SEC] under some circumstances of auditors'
withdrawal, and that attorneys should be treated the same way. We submit, however, that




Consider finally, who is the client in a securities context? The legally
correct answer for the vast majority of legal representationS239 (including
all representations covered by Sarbanes-Oxley section 307)240 is the cor-
poration, and not the CEO or some senior corporate manager. 241 As a
formal matter, the senior corporate manager and lawyer are co-agents
who share allegiance to their common principal (the corporation) rather
than to each other.242
But that's not the default prototype that comes to mind for the cate-
gory of client. Instead, most people and most lawyers think of the client
as a flesh-and-blood human being. Interestingly, the official comments
filed with the SEC track that default understanding instead of the legally
correct one. They consistently activate the prototype of the human man-
ager, which in turn triggers a familiar cultural script-that of the lawyer
safeguarding the dignity and autonomy of vulnerable individual defend-
ants from government overreaching. 243
The invitation to think of the client as the human manager suffuses the
comments-albeit indirectly-through appeals to the hallowed duties of
239. See HEINZ ET AL., supra note 160, at 43 (noting the study's findings that the "cor-
porate sector consumed more than twice the amount of Chicago lawyers' time devoted to
personal and small-business client work in 1995 (64 percent versus 29 percent)").
240. The Part 205 regulations enacted under Sarbanes-Oxley section 307 only apply to
corporate representations. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(g) (2009).
241. The law also makes clear that other corporate constituents do not constitute "the
client," although lawyers are entitled to defer to them to the extent that they are duly
authorized. But vested power always has its limitations. As William Simon has noted,
"[e]ven the highest authority, when it engages in an injurious and 'clearly' illegal course of
conduct, is not 'duly authorized."' William H. Simon, Whom (or What) Does the Organi-
zation's Lawyer Represent?: An Anatomy ofIntraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57, 81
(2003). Interestingly, an old Chinese maxim conveys a similar idea: "Even the emperor
needs the mandate of Heaven." To be clear, this is not intended to give lawyers carte
blanche to ignore the business judgment of client representatives who are entitled to defer-
ence on business matters. But if the co-agent advocates an illegal course of conduct that
threatens material harm to the corporate client, the normal rule of deference makes no
sense in light of the limited nature of the co-agent's authority.
For authority on the identity of the client in the organizational context, see Yablonski v.
United Mine Workers of America, 448 F.2d 1175, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 906 (1972); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.13(a) & cmt. 1 (2002) ("A law-
yer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its
duly authorized constituents . . . - Officers, directors, employees and shareholders are the
constituents of the corporate organizational client."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSI-
BILITY EC 5-18 (1983) ("A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity
owes his allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, rep-
resentative, or other person connected with the entity."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. b (2000) ("By representing the organization, a law-
yer does not thereby form a client-lawyer relationship with all or any individuals employed
by it or who direct its operations . . . .").
242. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAw OF LAWYERING: A HAND-
BOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 233 (1990); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.04 (2006) (definition of co-agents).
243. See Rhode, supra note 86, at 594, 605.
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loyalty244 and confidentiality. 245 For example, on loyalty, consider the
comment letter of 77 law firms, signed by almost all the elite law firms
that practice securities law:
We are concerned that Part 205 would drive a wedge between client
and the counsel who advised it on a matter by creating a conflict of
interest between the client and its counsel and forcing the client to
use other counsel to defend itself.246
Plainly, the SEC's original proposal (proposed Part 205, which included
mandatory noisy withdrawal) is being blamed for creating a conflict of
interest between lawyer and client.247 The problem with this statement is
that it is ludicrous in the relevant context of an organizational client. For
situations serious enough to implicate Part 205, it isn't Part 205 that has
created the conflict of interest; it is the manager for whom we have credi-
ble evidence of committing a material violation (by the regulations' own
terms) who has created the conflict of interest. Accordingly, compliance
with Part 205 doesn't make the lawyer disloyal to the true client (the
corporation). Only the wrongdoing manager is being disloyal to the cli-
ent by breaking the law and potentially exposing the client to liability.
Further, it isn't the client (the corporation) who now must "use other
counsel to defend itself";248 rather, it is the wrongdoing manager who
must hire his own lawyer.249
On confidentiality, consider the comment letter of 79 law firms:
244. Although this duty is not formally recited in the model professional conduct codes,
it applies to lawyers via the law of agency and the law of fiduciary relations. WOLFRAM,
supra note 189, § 4.8, at 146; Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75
IOWA L. REV. 1219, 1255-56 & nn.108-09 and accompanying text.
245. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.6 (2002); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1983).
246. Letter from 77 Law Firms, supra note 143.
247. See Letter from the N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n, supra note 131 ("Whether the
reporting obligation is placed on the lawyer or on the client is immaterial to the fact that it
is the reporting obligation itself that threatens to erode the candor required for meaningful
attorney-client communications to transpire.").
248. Letter from 77 Law Firms, supra note 143.
249. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (2002) (noting that the
lawyer for the organization cannot represent (or promise confidentiality to) an organiza-
tional constituent whose interest is adverse to that of the organization); STEPHEN GILLERS
& Roy D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 157-59 (2002)
(detailing state versions of Rule 1.13). As a result, the general rule is that the lawyer for
the corporation can continue to represent the corporation against a wrongdoing constitu-
ent. There are, however, a few exceptions. First, if the corporation's lawyer carelessly
"leads a constituent to believe that she is acting as the constituent's individual lawyer,"
then she is disqualified from representing the entity against that constituent. See Simon,
supra note 241, at 70. Second, when a shareholder derivative action is not in its early stages
and does not appear patently frivolous, some courts "have permitted corporate counsel to
represent the officers, while new counsel is retained for the corporation." Id. at 79. None of
this is to say that the Model Rules did a good job of clearly delineating the authority
structure of the corporation in cases where officers or directors are errant. For a critique of
Model Rule 1.13, see, for example, Stephen M. Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson,
Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299,
309-10; Stephen Gillers, Model Rule 1.13(c) Gives the Wrong Answer to the Question of
Corporate Counsel Disclosure, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 289 (1987); Kim, supra note 110, at
1044-46; Simon, supra note 241, at 80-83.
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In the vast majority of cases counsel enjoy the confidence of their
clients and, given access to the facts by their clients, succeed in per-
suading their clients to refrain from actions that harm the investing
public. If clients are afraid to confide candidly and completely in
their counsel and instead proceed without the advice of counsel, the
public will inevitably be harmed in some cases when it need not have
been.250
This passage repeats the traditional justification for the lawyer's duty of
confidentiality (and the attorney-client privilege), which posits that con-
fidentiality guarantees induce clients to "confide candidly and completely
in their counsel," 251 including revealing their illicit intentions, which in
turn enables lawyers to talk clients out of their nefarious plans.
Comments call for the preservation of full or complete candor,252 com-
plete confidentiality, 253 and full and frank communications between law-
yer and client.2 5 4 Some go so far as declaring confidences "inviolate"2 55
or "sacrosanct," 256 implicitly equating the legal profession with the medi-
eval priesthood. Likewise, the American College of Trial Lawyers main-
tains that, under pre-existing law, the client's "shared confidences" are
"absolutely privileged." 2 57 Similarly, the following passage from the Los
Angeles County Bar Association suggests that the "traditional balance"
struck by current law supports strict confidentiality:
250. Letter from 79 Law Firms, supra note 131.
251. Id. (emphasis added).
252. See, e.g., Letter from Troutman Sanders LLP to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC
(Apr. 7, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/troutmanO40703.htm
(noting that the SEC would "want to encourage [securities counsel] to give full candor in
their advice to issuers" (emphasis added)); Letter from Fed. Regulation Comm. of the Sec.
Indus. Ass'n, supra note 236 ("It is good for the integrity of the markets and for the invest-
ing public if a broker-dealer's officers can consult their attorneys in complete candor."
(emphasis added)).
253. See, e.g., Letter from 79 Law Firms, supra note 131.
254. See, e.g., Letter from Emerson Elec. Co. to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr. 7,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/wwwithers1.htm ("[T]he pre-
requisite to effective legal representation is full and frank disclosure by the client to his
lawyer . . . ." (emphasis added)); Letter from Jones Day, supra note 179 ("[An attorney
must be apprised of the entire universe of information that bears on a client's given situa-
tion. Our legal system has long recognized the need for full and frank discussions between
clients and attorneys" (emphasis added)).
255. See, e.g., Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2002), supra note
122 ("A client must feel free to discuss anything with his or her lawyer .... The observance
of the ethical obligation of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of a client
not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the
client but also encourages non-lawyers to seek early legal assistance." (emphasis added));
Letter from the Corp., Fin. & Sec. Section of the D.C. Bar, supra note 208 ("A fundamen-
tal principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the lawyer holds inviolate the client's
secrets and confidences." (emphasis added)).
256. See, e.g., Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2003), supra note
142 ("[I1t would be difficult for issuers to have confidence that their communications with
their attorneys would remain sacrosanct" (emphasis added)); Letter from Erik N. Frias,
supra note 142 ("By making an end-run around the duty of confidentiality, this alternative
seeks to give the [SEC) a peek into what has traditionally been considered sacrosanct, the
confidences between an attorney and his client." (emphasis added)).
257. Letter from the Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Apr.
2, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/macooperl.htm.
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Under the traditional balance, an attorney may advise a client, "tell
me everything that I should know about representing you-my lips
are sealed, and no information will be made public except to re-
present your interests." Thus the client can have confidence when
disclosing to a lawyer all relevant information without fear that the
lawyer will disclose it to third parties. 258
Although these positions are plausible for individual human clients, 259
they are farcical when applied to corporate clients. After all, the lawyer's
duty to keep secrets shared by corporate managers has always been se-
verely qualified.260 As lawyers working in-house can attest, whenever a
conflict of interest between a corporate employee and the corporation
becomes apparent, lawyers must give the "corporate Miranda warning,"
which reminds the employee that the lawyer's duty runs to the firm alone,
and thus no confidentiality to the employee can be promised. 261 In fact,
the lawyer may have a duty to reveal the manager's confidences to au-
thorized corporate constituents if necessary to prevent the manager from
causing reasonably foreseeable harm to the corporate client. 2 6 2 Moreo-
ver, any revelations made by the manager to corporate counsel have al-
258. Letter from the L.A. County Bar Ass'n, supra note 142. Admittedly, California
does have one of the strictest confidentiality rules in the nation. That said, this comment
suggests a uniform "traditional balance" without acknowledging California's outlier status
on the confidentiality rule. Id.
259. Although certainly not absolute, the strongest confidentiality protections nonethe-
less apply to individual clients who, by definition, would not be subject to the numerous de
facto exceptions to the duty of confidentiality enumerated in the text accompanying notes
260-66, infra. But even then, regardless of whether the client is an individual or an entity,
relevant exceptions to the duty of confidentiality have long existed such that the Los Ange-
les County Bar Association's claim that client constituents should be comfortable in dis-
closing all relevant information is an exaggeration, especially in the context at hand. As
detailed below, over four-fifths of states allowed lawyers to reveal confidential client infor-
mation to third parties for the purpose of averting a crime or fraud. See infra note 353.
Moreover, if it turns out that the client sought legal advice for the purpose of obtaining
assistance for a crime or fraud or the client ends up employing the lawyer's advice to
perpetrate a crime or fraud (regardless of the client's intent at the time of the advice), the
attorney-client privilege does not protect the client's revelations under the crime-fraud
exception. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 82 (2000);
Rotunda, supra note 34, at 475 & n.97.
260. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(b) (2002) ("If a lawyer..
knows that an officer .. . is engaged in ... a violation of a legal obligation to the organiza-
tion, or a violation of law that reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and that is
likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization . . . including, if warranted by
the circumstances to the highest authority that can act on behalf of the organization . .. .").
According to the official comment, the "highest authority" ordinarily would be the board
of directors. See id. R. 1.13 cmt. 5. The Restatement states that "[iln appropriate circum-
stances, the lawyer may request intervention" from the majority stock owner. RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. f (2000).
261. See Kim, supra note 5, at 444 (quoting John K. Villa, When and How to Issue
Corporate Miranda Warnings, ACC DOCKET, Sept. 2006, at 76).
262. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. e (2000)
("A lawyer is also required to act diligently . . . by taking steps to prevent reasonably
foreseeable harm to a client. . . . The lawyer is not prevented by rules of confidentiality
from acting to protect the interests of the organization by disclosing within the organiza-
tion communications gained from constituents who are not themselves clients."); Cramton
et. al, supra note 86, at 737.
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ways been subject to disclosure by higher authorities to anyone outside of
the corporation-no matter how destructive or embarrassing this may be
to the manager. 263 Both the duty of confidentiality and the attor-
ney-client privilege are ultimately controlled by the sitting board, who
may decide at any time to waive either and disclose managerial confi-
dences to outsiders.2 " In fact, companies often cooperate in prosecu-
tions against former misbehaving managers to win leniency for
themselves. 265 In addition, shareholder plaintiffs suing derivatively may
discover the contents of managerial confidences shared with corporate
counsel under the Garner doctrine-even over the board's objection.266
In sum, the bar repeatedly makes legally incorrect arguments about
loyalty and confidentiality. Whether these lawyers realize their errors is
hard to know.2 6 7 What's fascinating is that these arguments don't actu-
ally sound ridiculous, unless we continuously chant as a mantra "the cli-
ent is the corporation"-which we don't. Indeed, when we hear the bar's
appeals, we naturally make sense of them by implicitly accepting the bar's
framing of the client as the human manager.268
To the extent that this client confusion takes place, the bar has acti-
vated a heroic view of the lawyer-as-litigator. 269 Reading the comments
to the SEC, we forget the fact that the client is actually a public corpora-
tion with "access to economic and political resources" that make it "much
better able . . . to protect [itself] against overzealous enforcement prac-
tices than the bar's standard David and Goliath morality play would lead
one to believe." 270 Instead, the lawyer-as-litigator is seen as the only "in-
dependent bulwark" between citizens and official tyranny.271 As
263. Corporate managers who are engaged in material violations (as defined in 17
C.F.R. § 205.2(i) (2009)) have no legitimate claim of protection from the corporate attor-
ney-client privilege or the duty of confidentiality to the corporate client. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.13 cmt. 10 (2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(b) & cmt. b (2000); Cramton et. al, supra note 86, at 813.
264. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 358 (1985)
(holding that a corporation's bankruptcy trustee had power to waive the attorney-client
privilege with respect to pre-bankruptcy communications); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 73 cmt. j (2000) (describing who has the authority to waive
the organization's attorney-client privilege); Cramton et. al, supra note 86, at 738; Letter
from William H. Simon to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec. 13, 2002), available at http://
www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/simonl2l3O2.htm.
265. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality: Rethinking the Professional Responsibili-
ties of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1467 (2006).
266. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970) (allowing share-
holders in derivative action access to otherwise privileged communications between a CEO
and its counsel so long as "good cause" is shown), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
267. See Kim, supra note 11.
268. See Rhode, supra note 86, at 605-06.
269. See id. at 607-08.
270. David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in
Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICE AND TROUBLE CASES 68, 85 (Austin Sarat et al.
eds., 1998). See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'v REV. 95 (1974).
271. See, e.g., Evan A. Davis, Past Efforts and Future Possibilities: The Meaning of Pro-
fessional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1281, 1281 (2003) (describing "the role of the
legal profession as an independent bulwark between individuals or organizations and the
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Deborah Rhode has remarked, "It is far easier to defend a highly
privatistic vision of the social good and the profession's responsibilities
when the lawyer appears as a protector of the persecuted rather than
friend of the finance company." 272 As a result, client confusion bolsters
the bar's normative assertion that placing gatekeeping obligations on the
lawyer infringes upon her noble role as faithful and zealous advocate.
III. NEUTRALIZING THE RHETORIC
The bar's rhetoric primes us to think that the best example of the law-
yer is the litigator engaged in zealous advocacy; the best example of the
gatekeeper is the auditor engaged in disinterested evaluation; the best
example of the client is the human fending off the overreaching state.273
These three moves generate a contrast effect and a client confusion that
fortify the bar's anti-regulatory position.274 If one were so inclined, how
might one neutralize this rhetoric of lawyer exceptionalism, such that
gatekeeping would seem consistent with lawyering?
A. REDUCING THE CONTRAST
Recall from Part II.A the table that summarizes the descriptive prong
of lawyer exceptionalism-the claim that lawyers are qualitatively differ-
ent from gatekeeping professionals and thus are functionally unique:
Category Lawyer Gatekeeper
Prototype Litigator Auditor
Attribute Zealous advocacy Disinterested evaluation
(especially against the Certification
state)
A systematic approach to reducing the contrast would work at both the
level of attributes and the level of prototypes.
1. Attributes
a. Contesting zealous advocacy
Let's accept, for the moment, that the relevant prototypes for compari-
son should be litigators and auditors. Even then, it is possible to reduce
the contrast between the attributes that are associated with these proto-
types. First, let's focus on a litigator's zealous advocacy. To think that
litigators only and always zealously advocate is reductionist-as noted
earlier, a caricature or stereotype. 275 One way to dampen this stereotype
political branches of government," which "requires the lawyer to oppose the government
in defense of the client's legal interests").
272. Rhode, supra note 86, at 607-08.
273. See supra Part II.A-B.
274. Id.
275. See supra Part II.A.1.
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is to point out systematically that, depending on the context, litigators
often perform disinterested evaluations. 276
For instance, litigators are often expressly retained for corporate inter-
nal investigations, which require them to ascertain whether (i) a material
violation of the law has been committed in fact, and (ii) to advise the
board as to what, if anything, needs to be done to mitigate corporate
liability. 2 7 7 Even in the context of everyday lawsuits, litigators have to
gauge objectively the strengths and weaknesses of their client's case in
order to offer the best advice. 278 Under the constraints of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the litigator certifies to the court that
she has undertaken a disinterested evaluation of her client's allegations
when she signs a pleading or written motion.279 And state ethics codes
have placed onto litigators explicit duties to evaluate and root out vexa-
tious cases since as early as 1887.280
276. See supra Part II.A.2.
277. Prominent litigators, such as William McLucas and David Boies, are retained by
corporate boards to lead internal investigations of alleged corporate malfeasance. McLu-
cas was retained by the boards of Enron, WorldCom, and Qwest Communications. See
John M. Holcomb, Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related Legal Issues, and
Global Comparisons, 32 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 175, 213 (2004). McLucas was ranked
as a "top litigation lawyer" in the 2003 edition of Euromoney's Guide to the World's Lead-
ing Litigation Lawyers. See William R. McLucas, http://www.wilmerhale.com/william
mclucas/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2010). Boies, who famously argued on behalf of former Vice
President Al Gore before the U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore, was named "Commer-
cial Litigator of the Year" by Who's Who. See David Boies, http://www.bsfllp.com/lawyers/
data/0001 (last visited Feb. 17, 2010). Boies was retained by the board of Tyco Interna-
tional. See Holcomb, supra, at 213. In conducting internal corporate investigations, liti-
gators interview throngs of corporate employees, review piles of documents, and confer
with board members. See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations: Legal
Ethics, Professionalism and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 859, 888-
92. In short, they invariably engage in fact-finding, counseling, and, indeed, disinterested
evaluation.
278. See Gilson, supra note 5, at 882-86.
279. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a)-(b). By signing pleadings and written motions as the
attorney of record, the litigator certifies to the court that she has undertaken a disinter-
ested evaluation-"an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances"-to determine
whether the legal and factual contentions in her papers are meritless. Id. By imposing on
the litigator an affirmative duty to investigate and evaluate the veracity of her client's fac-
tual allegations and the plausibility of legal claims-backed by the threat of court sanc-
tion-Rule 11 requires her to function like a gatekeeper of the litigation process with an
explicit duty to control and screen access to civil litigation. See Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 19 (1983); Gilson, supra note 5, at 876-77. If
the lawyer is unable to vouch for her client in the manner prescribed by Rule 11, she must
decline to represent the client in a lawsuit. In other words, she must uphold the classic
gatekeeping duty to withhold services from one's client. See Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chil-
ling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Impact on
Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 6 n.19
(2003) (identifying ten sanctioning provisions, including Rule 26(g)).
To be clear, I am not making an empirical claim that in the real world, Rule 11 success-
fully forces litigators to weed out meritless lawsuits. But Rule 11 has caused litigators to
undertake some disinterested evaluation and certification in their everyday practice. In
short, litigators actually do what everyone knows auditors are supposed to do-but in the
service of the fair and efficient allocation of judicial resources.
280. See, e.g., ALABAMA LAWYERS CODE OF ETmIcs § 14 (1887) ("An attorney must
decline in a civil cause to conduct a prosecution, when satisfied that the purpose is merely
to harass or injure the opposite party, or to work oppression and wrong"); MODEL RULES
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In addition, the litigator must engage in other behavior that doesn't fit
neatly with the bar's depiction of "zealous advocacy." 281 For example,
the litigator must disclose controlling legal authority directly adverse to
her client's position; she must rectify a client's perjury to the tribunal,
which may necessitate a noisy withdrawal or even disclosure; and, in re-
sponse to a proper discovery request for a smoking gun document that
could demolish her client's case, she must produce it.2 8 2 Indeed, these
behaviors seem more in line with disinterested evaluation than with zeal-
ous advocacy.
Given that litigators don't always single-mindedly advocate, we need to
pay attention to context. And, quite simply, zealous advocacy is not war-
ranted in this one. Part 205 addresses narrowly what steps a lawyer "ap-
pearing and practicing before the [SEC] in the representation of an
issuer" 283 must take when she encounters "credible evidence, based upon
which it would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent
and competent attorney not to conclude that it is reasonably likely that a
material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur."284
Thus, Part 205 directs the lawyer, who has just learned of a possible
existing or imminent law violation, how to proceed in such a situation.285
The relevant situation calls for lawyers' disinterested evaluation, which is
integral to fact-finding (to determine what, if anything, happened) and to
counseling (to communicate the results of any fact finding and to advise
on what the law requires of clients). 286 Disinterested evaluation is neces-
sary to ensure that lawyers reasonably determine legal risks when they
counsel their clients to comply with the law.2 87 The relevant context does
not call for the broader license to characterize facts and law that one
ordinarily associates with advocacy.288
Indeed, all of the structural elements that have historically legitimated
OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.1 (2002) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or
assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that
is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1)
(1969) ("[A] lawyer shall not . . . file a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a
trial, or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that
such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."); CANONS OF
PROF'L ETHIcs Canon 30 (1968) ("The lawyer must decline to conduct a civil cause or
make a defense when convinced that it is intended merely to harass or to injure the oppo-
site party or to work oppression or wrong.").
281. See Letter from Sullivan & Cromwell, supra note 123 (describing the bar's depic-
tion of a zealous advocate).
282. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R 3.3(a)(1)-(2) (2002) (disclosing adverse
legal authority); id. (rectifying client perjury); id. R. 3.3(b) & R. 3.4(d) (complying with
discovery requests). For a more comprehensive list of duties that constrain zealous advo-
cacy, see Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical
View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIo Sr. L.J. 243, 262-63 (1985).
283. 17 C.F.R. § 205.1 (2009).
284. Id. § 205.2(e) (defining "evidence of a material violation").
285. Id. § 205.1.
286. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
287. Id.
288. See Cramton et. al, supra note 86, at 769.
2010] 119
SMU LAW REVIEW
the function of adversary advocacy are lacking. 289 As identified by Mur-
ray Schwartz, those missing structural elements are: (i) an "adversary to
challenge the client's statement of facts, to sharpen the issues, to seek
clarification of positions, or to point to countervailing considerations";
(ii) an "impartial arbiter . . . charged with the responsibility of reaching
the correct decision under the law" and ensuring that both sides follow
the "rules of the contest"; and (iii) procedural rules that constrain the
conduct of both parties.290 Critically, those procedural rules operate to
produce an open factual record to be shared by the parties as the basis for
their arguments and to serve as the factual foundation for the arbiter's
decision. 291 All of the above elements collectively operate to legitimate
the function of advocacy by restraining it and guarding against its predict-
able abuses. 292
But none of those elements is present in the situation targeted by Part
205. In that situation, the client will not have been charged with the al-
leged law violation in which case defense advocacy would be war-
ranted.293 (In fact, defense advocacy for past violations is expressly
exempted from Part 205 reporting duties. 2 9 4) In the relevant situation,
the lawyer and client are entirely on their own: there is no adversary to
counterbalance the lawyer's rendition of the facts, no opponent to chal-
lenge the lawyer's interpretation of the law, no referee to police parties'
self-interested behavior, and no impartial arbiter charged with ascertain-
ing the truth.295 In fact, the only constraint on the client's actions and the
289. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 677.
290. Id.
291. For example, the rules governing discovery, subpoena power to compel witnesses
and documents, and-in criminal contexts-rights to confrontation and compulsory pro-
cess all operate to produce an open factual record. See U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(1)-(2), 45.
292. See Schwartz, supra note 174, at 677 ("Putting one's best foot forward by stepping
on the feet of the other side makes sense because of the presence of an impartial arbiter.");
Wilkins, supra note 93, at 1188 ("[T]he permissions [underlying advocacy] are based on the
presumption that adversary processes are more likely to work fairly and effectively if both
parties are represented by advocates who have relatively few obligations to parties other
than their own clients.").
293. See Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle Over Waiver of
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 21 (2008) ("In many cases, the internal
investigation is substantially completed by the time government agents come knocking at
the corporation's door.").
294. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2)-(3) (2009) (imposing a duty to report where a
lawyer is representing issuer in non-litigation context), with id. § 205.3(b)(6)(ii) (imposing
no duty to report where a lawyer is retained "[tjo assert, consistent with his or her profes-
sional obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer . . . in any investigation or
judicial or administrative proceeding relating to such evidence of a material violation"); see
also id. § 205.3(b)(7)(ii) (addressing qualified legal compliance committees). For a criti-
cism that this exemption, as written, is overly broad and mistakenly conflates legitimate
advocacy with certain forms of counseling, see Cramton et. al, supra note 86, at 769-79.
Criminal defense advocacy for past violations is the context for which the strongest policy
justifications for attorney-client confidentiality hold. See, e.g., David Luban, Lawyers As
Upholders of Human Dignity (When They Aren't Busy Assaulting It), 2005 U. ILL. L. REV.
815, 830-38 (exploring justifications for the attorney-client privilege in representations of
individual criminal defendants).
295. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 174, at 677.
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lawyer's assistance is provided by the law itself, as interpreted by the cli-
ent's lawyer.2 9 6 Also, no one-other than the lawyer and the client-has
ready access to any facts that might establish wrongdoing. 297 To describe
this situation as necessitating the lawyer's advocacy is to wholly disregard
the structural justifications underlying adversary advocacy. 298
Moreover, not only is advocacy in this context inapposite; it can also be
dangerous and illegal.2 9 9 Unlike the adjudicable facts of litigation pro-
ceedings, the facts in this context are the "hot, live, alterable and current
facts of a client's immediate affairs."300 As a result, the lawyer is criti-
cally situated to either facilitate or prevent legal wrongs.30 To the extent
that the lawyer's advocacy in this situation assists the illegal act or its
concealment, the lawyer runs the risk of aiding the offense and being
prosecuted for it.302 Although lawyers often protest that they shouldn't
be liable for doing what lawyers generally do,303 principles of criminal,
tort, and agency law make clear that legal services are not categorically
exempt from accessorial liability and that lawyers are not free to know-
ingly facilitate crimes, frauds, or their cover-ups. 304
296. W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. REv. 1167,
1173 (2004).
297. See Schwartz, supra note 174, at 677-78.
298. See id.
299. See generally Hazard, supra note 136.
300. Brown, supra note 189, at 941.
301. In preventing harm, the lawyer can frustrate the violation before it is committed
(and thus foreclose any possibility of client liability) or, if the violation is ongoing, save the
client from further sanction by stopping the harm flowing from the violation. See Gillers,
supra note 249, at 301. If the material law violation is unrectified and undisclosed, it will
often be classified as an ongoing securities violation. See infra notes 353-62 and accompa-
nying text. Thus, assuming an informationally efficient market, the sooner a securities vio-
lation is detected and disclosed, the fewer investors will be harmed by the misleading
disclosures or omissions. Therefore, it behooves the company to rectify and disclose viola-
tions as soon as possible in an effort to mitigate damages. Also, early detection and rectifi-
cation may mitigate criminal liability. See Seigel, supra note 293, at 10 (noting that federal
prosecutors, in deciding whether to indict a corporation, will consider, among other factors,
"whether the corporation had taken steps voluntarily to disclose the wrongdoing" and "the
extent to which the corporation took remedial action once the criminality was discov-
ered"). Moreover, in corporate criminal sentencing, organizations can earn reductions in
criminal fines by diligently detecting and redressing employee criminality. See U.S. SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8B2.1(a), 8C2.5 (2004).
302. Hazard, supra note 136, at 682 (citing cases holding that "it is improper for a law-
yer to give advice as to how to commit a crime or fraud or how to conceal criminal or
fraudulent acts").
303. See supra notes 136 and accompanying text.
304. See Hazard, supra note 26, at 291. To be sure, the determination of liability for any
particular case will hinge on factual details, such as the nature of the assistance and the
lawyer's state of mind. As Hazard notes, "the farther we move away from simple, un-
suggestive advice, and the closer we move toward active assistance, the farther we get from
what the law encourages and permits and the closer we get to what the law abhors and
proscribes." Hazard, supra note 136, at 671. For example, "courts have held that it is
unlawful for a lawyer to negotiate for his client in pursuance of an illegal purpose or to
prepare documents to effectuate it." Id. at 682 (citation omitted) ("[T]he cases say not only
that liability results from actual knowledge of the client's illegal purpose, but also that it
results from knowledge of facts that reasonably should excite suspicion.").
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This is not to say that advocacy should be confined to formal adjudica-
tive proceedings or that it is always crystal clear in which contexts advo-
cacy is legitimate. 305 Indeed, there may be situations far afield from
adjudication that nonetheless warrant some form of adversary advo-
cacy.3 0 6 However, the farther one moves away from the paradigm of ad-
judication (and the attendant structural elements), the tougher it
becomes to argue that the situation justifies advocacy.307 My main point
here is that the specific situation targeted by Part 205 does not justify
advocacy. 308
b. Contesting disinterested evaluation
Now that we've worked on the litigator side of the contrast effect, what
about working the auditor side? If litigators are not always unbridled
advocates, maybe auditors are not always disinterested umpires. 309
The fact is, instead of watching out for shareholder interests, auditors
have been blamed for aligning themselves with the overly aggressive ac-
counting positions taken by their client's management. 310 The poster
child for this problem was the late Arthur Andersen LLP (Andersen),
which had countenanced serious GAAP violations so that Enron could
cook its books.311 But Andersen was not unique in its acquiescence to its
client's management. 312 An empirical study covering 1,000 large public
companies from 1997 to 2001 yielded no evidence that the quality of pub-
lic company audits performed by Andersen was any worse than that of
305. Indeed, for any given set of facts, the line between advocacy and counseling may
be uncertain. "[B]ut it is also true that every legal distinction of any import is subject to
the blurry-line critique," and securities lawyers are paid to negotiate "the gray between
advocacy and advice." Cramton et. al, supra note 86, at 777. For further analysis of the
distinction between counseling and advocacy, see WOLFRAM, supra note 189, § 13.2.1, at
688-90. That said, even the ABA acknowledges that advocacy and counseling are different.
Thomas D. Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REv. 439, 443-44
(1990); see MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILTrY EC 7-3 (1980) ("A lawyer may serve
simultaneously as both advocate and adviser, but the two roles are essentially different.").
306. See supra note 213.
307. Wilkins, supra note 93, at 1188 (making this point with respect to a hostile audit).
308. To be sure, some lawyers will insist on stretching the definition of advocacy to
encompass just about anything that lawyers could conceivably do for their clients. But
many of those broader definitions of advocacy (such as "acting in a manner that furthers
the client's interests") are so over-inclusive that they fail to distinguish advocacy from the
common functions of ordinary agents, including real estate agents and auditors. Stated
another way, the broader the definition of "advocacy" advanced by the bar, the more likely
it undermines the bar's descriptive claim that lawyers perform unique functions. See supra
notes 189, 213.
309. See generally Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral
Insight into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 133 (2000).
310. See Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different?
An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. EMPIRI-
CAL LEGAL S-rUD. 263, 288 (2004).
311. George J. Benston, The Regulation of Accountants and Public Accounting Before
and After Enron, 52 EMORY L.J. 1325, 1336-38 (2003) (detailing both GAAP errors and
aggressive interpretations of GAAP that nonetheless "conformed to the letter of the
GAAP rules").
312. See Eisenberg & Macey, supra note 310, at 263.
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the other large accounting firms.313 Further, laboratory and field studies
of auditor behavior confirm auditors' general tendency toward alignment
with management. 314
None of this should surprise anyone familiar with either the history or
the business model of accounting firms. For decades, the accounting pro-
fession has fought to resist a uniform and cohesive body of clear account-
ing principles and instead has embraced positions designed to minimize
friction with corporate managers.3 15 Accountants pushed for the right to
make unqualified certifications of management's accounting even if man-
agement's choice of accounting principles was ill-advised.31 6 They op-
posed restrictions on "pooling of interest" accounting for mergers and
acquisitions, even though pooling was labeled a "tool of deception" by
the Federal Trade Commission.317 They sought to reduce the scope of
audits and the level of testing, resisting a mandatory forensic component
to the audit.3 18 Moreover, those same accounting firms who audit clients'
financial records have long provided tax advisory services, 319 including
tax compliance, tax planning, and tax advocacy 320 services. And, during
the last half century, these accounting firms have provided management
advisory serviceS321 as part of the accounting industry's effort to redefine
itself as providing full-service business consulting. 322 Given those myriad
opportunities to expand revenues beyond audit fees, it is no wonder that
313. See id. at 264-65 (noting that the study's analysis "yields no evidence that account-
ing profession problems that lead to [financial] restatements were unique to Andersen"
and suggesting that "accounting profession problems are industrywide and not linked to
any particular firm").
314. See Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving Bias
for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 1597, 1640-49 (2000). These studies show that
auditors often came to advocate their clients' positions on accounting issues. Id. Account-
ants were "more willing to subordinate objectivity and independence in order to resolve
accounting conflicts in favor of their clients, less willing to give qualified opinions, includ-
ing going concern qualifications, and less willing to resign from accounts the more income
they derive from that client." Id. at 1644.
315. See COFFEE, supra note 5, at 125.
316. Id. at 124-25, 130, 137; GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIs MERINO, A His-
TORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF Ac-
COUNTING 275-77 (1998).
317. COFFEE, supra note 5, at 133 (describing the Big Eight's opposition to efforts to
limit pooling); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 418-30 (3d ed.
2003).
318. COFFEE, supra note 5, at 141-42.
319. See id. at 120, 123; PREvITS & MERINO, supra note 316, at 181-82. Accounting
firms began offering tax advisory services following the enactment of federal income tax
law in 1913. COFFEE, supra note 5, at 120; PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 316, at 181-82.
320. Accountants represent their clients before the IRS in non-criminal tax proceed-
ings. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.3(b) (2009).
321. Such services include business appraisal and valuation, bookkeeping, litigation
support, and financial information systems design and implementation. Much of these non-
audit services were restricted (although not completely banned) by section 201 of
Sarbanes-Oxley. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 201(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g)(h) (2006).
322. MARK STEVENS, THE BIG Six: THE SELLING OUT OF AMERICA'S Top AccouNT-
ING FIRMS 105 (1991). To be sure, by 2000, this industry trend toward consulting had begun
to reverse when accounting firms began disposing of their non-tax consulting divisions.
Nonetheless, Deloitte & Touche, for example, continues to market consulting services, and
accounting firms in general continue to derive significant revenues from consulting. See
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the accounting firms that we expect to act as public watchdogs have acted
more like the precious lapdogs of the managers who feed them.3 2 3
In sum, litigators engage in some disinterested evaluation and auditors
engage in conduct that resembles advocacy. Whether they're formally
supposed to or not is beside the point. The goal here is merely to spell
out descriptively the ways in which flesh-and-blood litigators and auditors
share overlapping attributes in the real world. Flagging these similarities
helps counter the bar's descriptive claim that lawyers are in fact function-
ally unique.
2. Prototypes
The strategy above-of contesting attributes-is obvious. Less obvious
is the strategy for activating alternative prototypes, which is a technique
suggested by a cognitive science approach to analyzing the bar's rhetoric.
In other words, why not replace the litigator and the auditor?
a. Replacing the litigator
The bar's sharp emphasis on the litigator makes us forget the non-liti-
gating lawyers who regularly perform disinterested evaluations and certi-
fications as part of their core competencies. Take, for example, those
lawyers practicing corporate and securities law (corporate lawyers).324
Corporate lawyers typically serve as quarterbacks or "field marshals" 325
Alvin A. Arens & Randal J. Elder, Perspectives on Auditing Education After Sarbanes-
Oxley, 21 ISSUES IN Accr. EDUC. 345, 348 (2006).
323. To be sure, general audit quality may have improved since Sarbanes-Oxley ended
the self-regulation of the accounting profession and restricted the provision of certain non-
audit services believed to have impaired auditor independence. For a discussion of
Sarbanes-Oxley's restriction (in section 201) on certain non-audit consulting services and
its likely effects, see Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack
Corporate Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1891
(2007). Nonetheless, there remains reason for caution in light of the fact that not all con-
flicts of interest were banned. See Arens & Elder, supra note 322, at 348 (summarizing
what Sarbanes-Oxley failed to proscribe, including tax consulting services).
324. Although usage varies somewhat, for the purposes of this Article, I will adopt the
most prevailing usage of the term "corporate lawyers" to describe those transactional law-
yers who specialize in corporations and securities law and assist companies in business
planning and structuring corporate finance transactions. Since more specialized types of
lawyers are typically experts in the fields of broker-dealer compliance and regulation, in-
vestment management, and securities litigation and enforcement, I mean to exclude them
from this definition of "corporate lawyers." A useful reference point is the law firm of
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, which boasts an extraordinarily wide range
of capabilities on matters relating to securities laws. It has a "Corporate and Transactional"
practice area, which handles private and public corporate financings, including venture
financings and public offerings. See Wilmer Hale, Corporate and Transactional, http://www.
wilmerhale.com/corporate/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2010). In contrast, the "securities" practice
area handles broker-dealer compliance and regulation, investment management, and liti-
gation and enforcement, which are also excluded from my definition of "corporate law-
yers." See Wilmer Hale, Securities, http://www.wilmerhale.comlsecurities/ (last visited Feb.
17, 2010).
325. A. A. Sommer, Jr., Comm'r, SEC, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities
Lawyer, supra note 46 ("[T]he registration statement has always been a lawyer's document
and with very, very rare exceptions the attorney has been the field marshall [sic] who coor-
dinated the activities of others engaged in the registration process . . . .").
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of the public offering process. For public offerings, corporate lawyers are
regularly retained to conduct extensive factual investigations of the cor-
porate issuer for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of the issuer's re-
gistration statement filed with the SEC. This "due diligence" has been
operationalized into an elaborate set of standard verification procedures
that law firms have developed over time. 3 2 6
When performing due diligence, the corporate lawyer systematically
corroborates facts asserted in the company's registration statement. 327
For example, she may verify that the corporate issuer holds valid,
unexpired leases for every property that it purports to occupy. For state-
ments requiring evaluative judgment, such as statements describing and
assessing the particular risks associated with the issuer's business,328 the
process is more complex. The lawyer typically discusses such statements
with management and assesses them from the perspective of a reasonable
investor.329 Any lawyer who has performed due diligence on behalf of
her clients recognizes that she has engaged in disinterested evaluation,
which draws on precisely the same truth-searching and fact-corroborating
faculties that auditors employ for an audit.
Corporate lawyers also provide certifications to their clients or
counterparties in connection with public offerings.330 This certification,
known as a Rule 10b-5 or "negative assurance" opinion, assures the opin-
ion recipient (the client or counterparty) that the lawyers are not aware
of any material misrepresentation or omission by the issuer in the regis-
tration statement.331 Lawyers provide such a certification on the basis of
the due diligence that they've performed. Indeed, the certification is use-
less unless the lawyer has undertaken a disinterested evaluation.
326. Kraakman, supra note 5, at 82-83. Although the scope of due diligence will vary
from firm to firm and from client to client, lawyers may be involved in legal, business,
financial, and, sometimes, accounting due diligence. See Valerie Ford Jacob, The Due Dili-
gence Process from the Underwriter's Perspective, in CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE IN
M&A AND SECURITIES OFFERINGs 2008, at 89, 96-104 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course
Handbook Ser. No. 14933, 2008). See infra note 348 and accompanying text for an explana-
tion of why due diligence is performed.
327. COFFEE, supra note 5, at 349.
328. A description of the material risks of investing in the issuer's securities is located in
the "Risk Factors" section of the registration statement. See Steven V. Bernard et al., Risk
Factors Disclosure and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, in SECURITIES FILINGS
2007, at 53, 55-56 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 11099, 2007).
329. See infra note 349 for discussion of the "reasonable investor" standard.
330. Underwriters generally require both their own counsel as well as issuer's counsel
to release a certification. See Jacob, supra note 326, at 103.
331. John C. Coffee, Jr., Can Lawyers Wear Blinders? Gatekeepers and Third-Party
Opinions, 84 TEX. L. REv. 59, 64 (2005); ABA Task Force on Sec. Law Opinions, Negative
Assurance on Securities Offerings, 59 Bus. LAw. 1513-16 (2004) (noting that this opinion
practice has been adopted for registered offerings, including short form registrations on
Form S-3 and take-downs from shelf registrations under Rule 415, and certain unregistered
offerings, such as Rule 144A and Regulation S offerings).
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b. Replacing the auditor
Similarly, the bar's emphasis on the auditor prototype veils the exis-
tence of various other gatekeepers who in the real world may provide
even less disinterested evaluation than auditors. Take, for example, in-
vestment bankers, who may be the capital markets' most important gate-
keepers. 3 3 2 They are regularly retained to render fairness opinions about
the valuation of target companies in connection with major acquisi-
tions.333 Although everyone agrees that they are supposed to be objec-
tive when performing this function,334 investment bankers have been
known to fall short. They have been criticized and held liable by courts
for delivering unreliable opinions that were biased toward the valuation
positions held by their clients' management. 335 In short, investment
332. Investment bankers are primarily regulated and sanctionable by the Financial In-
dustry Regulatory Authority (FINRA, formerly the National Association of Securities
Dealers), which is monitored by the SEC. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change
Relating to a New Limited Representative Registration Category for Investment Banking
Professionals, Exchange Act Release No. 59,757, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,268 (Apr. 21, 2009).
Also, the SEC can apply a wide range of sanctions against investment bankers. It may
initiate administrative proceedings to revoke a broker-dealer's registration. See Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2006). The SEC may also suspend or
expel the investment banker from a national securities exchange or FINRA. See id.
§§ 19(a)(3), 15A(1)(2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(1), 78s(a)(3). Investment bankers are probably
the capital markets' most important gatekeepers in terms of securities anti-fraud liability.
Steven P. Marino & Renee D. Marino, An Empirical Study of Recent Securities Class Ac-
tion Settlements Involving Accountants, Attorneys or Underwriters, 22 SEC. REG. L.J. 115,
174 (1994).
333. A "fairness opinion" is an opinion based on a careful valuation of the target com-
pany that the proposed deal consideration is "fair from a financial point of view" to the
shareholders. See David M. Silk & David A. Katz, Takeover Law and Practice 2001, in
DOING DEALS 2001: UNDERSTANDING THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF TRANSACTIONAL PRAC-
TICE 9, 47 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. BO-OOVN, 2001); Steve
J. Cleveland, An Economic and Behavioral Analysis of Investment Bankers When Deliver-
ing Fairness Opinions, 58 ALA. L. REv. 299, 301-02 (2006). Fairness opinions are usually
issued to the target company, although they may also be issued to the acquirer corporation
if, for example, the transaction is an exchange offer and not a cash-out merger. A "fair"
price is generally understood to mean "a price within the range that a reasonable and
prudent board would accept" in similar circumstances. See Lucian Bebchuk & Marcel
Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They and What Can Be Done About It?, 1989
DUKE L. J. 27, 33 n.34; see also id. at 30-44 (discussing alternative definitions).
334. While everyone agrees that investment bankers should be disinterested in this role,
not everyone agrees that they should be liable for faulty fairness opinions. For various
views, see, for example, COFFEE, supra note 5, at 2 (identifying the investment banker as
gatekeeper when giving a fairness opinion); William J. Carney, Fairness Opinions: How
Fair Are They and Why We Should Do Nothing About It, 70 WASH. U. L. Q. 523, 525
(1992) (arguing against imposing gatekeeper liability on investment banks for fairness
opinions and maintaining that fairness opinions "assur[e] the continued application of the
business judgment rule during an era when it has been under severe attack"); Ted J. Fiflis,
Responsibility of Investment Bankers to Shareholders, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 497 (1992)
(advocating gatekeeper liability for investment banks rendering fairness opinions).
335. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, The SEC and MDP: Implications of the Self-Serving
Bias for Independent Auditing, 61 OHIo ST. L.J. 1597, 1623 (2000) (noting criticisms of
fairness opinions as "made-to-order recommendations . . . that support managers' pre-
established positions," "virtually worthless," and a "deceit upon the investing public and
the marketplace generally"); John S. Rubenstein, Merger & Acquisition Fairness Opinions:
A Critical Look at Judicial Extensions of Liability to Investment Banks, 93 GEO. L.J. 1723,
1726-27 (2005); id. at 1729-41 (summarizing case law imposing liability on investment
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bankers have sometimes acted more as managerial rubber stamps than as
gatekeepers watching out for shareholders' interests.
As another possible prototype of a gatekeeper, consider securities ana-
lysts, 336 who have historically been regarded as public watchdogs337 for
evaluating and making recommendations to investors about companies'
securities.338 Although everyone agrees that they are supposed to be ob-
jective and truthful, securities analysts have been accused of publicly
pumping stocks that they privately disparaged. 339 In a prominent exam-
ple, securities analysts paid a whopping $1.4 billion in penalties to New
York authorities and agreed to structural reforms to ensure the indepen-
dence of securities analysts. 340 As noted by John Coffee, these securities
analysts had acted "more like cheerleaders than objective umpires." 341
As a concrete suggestion, instead of litigators and auditors, the proto-
types of corporate lawyers and investment bankers (or securities analysts)
could be activated. Both investment bankers and securities analysts bear
bankers). The unreliability of some fairness opinions may be due to conflicts of interest
that compromise objectivity, such as the bundling of an opinion fee with the larger "success
fee," payable only if the transaction closes. Ann Davis & Monica Langley, Open Secrets-
Good Reviews: Opinions Labeling Deals "Fair" Can Be Far From Independent, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 29, 2004, at Al; see Rubenstein, supra, at 1726-29 (summarizing conflicts of
interest).
336. Securities analysts are regulated by the FINRA and the New York Stock Ex-
change, self-regulatory agencies that are monitored by the SEC, as well as the SEC itself.
See COFFEE, supra note 5, at 245 (explaining the regulation of analysts employed by
broker-dealers).
337. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658 (1983) (describing securities analysts as
"ferret[ing] out" information to help investors). Only recently has scholarly commentary
focused on the securities analyst as a capital markets gatekeeper. Under the more narrow
definition of "gatekeeper" adopted in this Article ("private intermediaries who can pre-
vent harm to the securities markets by disrupting the misconduct of their client representa-
tives"), only securiteis analysts employed by the issuer's investment bank would technically
qualify as gatekeepers.
338. See Jill Fisch & Hillary Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regu-
lation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1040-43 (2003) (describing the role of analysts).
339. In 2002, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced that high-profile
securities analysts had publicly recommended that investors buy stocks that they had pri-
vately disparaged, even referring to touted stocks as "dogs" or "junk" in internal e-mails.
Fisch & Sale, supra note 338, at 1037. As it turned out, the objectivity of securities analysts
had been infected by (among other things) conflicts of interest, including the fact that
analysts often reported on companies who happened to be the underwriting clients of their
firms or whose stocks they personally owned. See id. at 1043-56; see also Robert A. Pren-
tice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 789-92 (2006). In addi-
tion, excessive optimism had clouded the objectivity of securities analysts. Fisch & Sale,
supra note 338, at 1048.
340. See Press Release, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, SEC NYSE and
State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices: $1.4 Bil-
lion Global Settlement Includes Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002), availa-
ble at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm; see also Joint Press Release, SEC et al.,
Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of
Interest Between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. Also, additional regulations have been enacted to
enhance analyst objectivity. See Fisch & Sale, supra note 338, at 1037-38, 1061-71 (summa-
rizing regulations).
341. John C. Coffee, Jr., A Course of Inaction: Where Was the SEC When the Mutual
Fund Scandal Happened?, 2004 LEGIs. AFF. 46, 46.
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some gatekeeping responsibilities, so why shouldn't the similarly situated
corporate lawyer? Even if we stick with auditor to represent the category
of gatekeeper, by bringing the corporate lawyer to mind, we see striking
similarities in the context of public offerings. First, as shown above, both
auditors and corporate lawyers perform disinterested evaluations to en-
sure the accuracy of the registration statement in accordance with the
respective regulations in the Securities Act of 1933.342 Second, both audi-
tors and corporate lawyers are required to be named in the issuer's regis-
tration statement, which effectively puts investors on notice that the
corporate issuer has been examined by professionals. 343 Third, both audi-
tors' and corporate lawyers' disinterested evaluations and certifications
benefit public investors.344
To be sure, auditors are required by law to perform their disinterested
evaluations and certifications and to do so explicitly for the benefit of
public investors.345 By contrast, no law affirmatively mandates that law-
yers perform these functions or invites investors to rely on lawyers' Rule
10b-5 certifications. 346 But what the law has sought to encourage directly
with respect to auditors, it has done so indirectly with respect to lawyers.
By creating a private cause of action under section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 (section 11) that enables investors to sue all key players in
the public offering process (except for lawyers) for material errors found
in the company's registration statement,347 the law has furnished strong
incentives for these players to use lawyers and to delegate to them the
tasks of disinterested evaluation and certification. 348 In addition, by con-
342. Regulation S-X applies to the financial statements and Regulation S-K applies to
all other portions of the registration statement. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.1-01, 229.10 (2009).
343. See Securities Act of 1933 Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa, Item 23 (2006) (requiring
disclosure of "the names and addresses of counsel who have passed on the legality of the
issue"); id. Items 25, 26 (certification by accountants); see also Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a)(2), 78m(b), 78n (2006).
344. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1296-97 (2003).
345. See id. at 1310 (noting that no SEC rule expressly requires lawyers to perform due
diligence in connection with the preparation of disclosure documents).
346. Id. at 1310; see also JAMES D. COX ET. AL, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 505 (2008) (noting the omission of lawyers as section 11 defendants); Coffee,
supra note 344, at 1312 ("Alone, the attorney escapes and need not certify in any way as to
the accuracy of the client's disclosures."); Richard R. Howe, The Duties and Liabilities of
Attorneys in Rendering Legal Opinions, 1989 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 283, 287 (noting that
lawyers' Rule 10b-5 opinions "are not addressed to the public and the public is not entitled
to rely upon them"). However, the regulations do require lawyers to issue and file as an
exhibit a very limited certification. See Item 601, Exhibits of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R.
§ 229.601(b)(5) (2009) (requiring the inclusion as an exhibit of "[a]n opinion of counsel as
to the legality of the securities being registered, indicating whether they will, when sold, be
legally issued, fully paid and non-assessable, and, if debt securities, whether they will be
binding obligations of the registrant").
347. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006).
348. Due diligence is performed by lawyers for both underwriters and issuers, although
underwriters' counsel typically engage in the most formal and comprehensive undertaking,
except in shelf registrations under SEC Rule 415. See Christian A. Young, Looking Back
on WorldCom: Addressing Underwriters' Due Diligence in Shelf Registration Offerings and
the Need for Reform, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 521, 521 (2007). Due diligence enables under-
writers to prove that they met their screening obligations to public investors-that they
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ditioning relief from section 11 liability on due diligence standards that
reference the perspective of the reasonable investor, the law has ensured
that lawyers, to whom these crucial functions have been delegated, fully
consider investor interests.349 Although the securities bar will predictably
demur, the reality is that when corporate lawyers perform disinterested
evaluations for their clients or issue certifications for their clients or
counterparties, lawyers are in fact assisting them in discharging their in-
vestigatory duties to the investing public.350
In sum, by highlighting real world overlaps in attributes and by activat-
ing alternative prototypes, the mental distance between the categories of
lawyer and gatekeeper can be significantly reduced. We may come to see
the situation more like this:
had conducted a "reasonable investigation" which had formed the basis of their reasonable
belief in the accuracy of the company's assertions. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (2006); COX ET
AL., supra note 346, at 483-84 (summarizing the various affirmative defenses available to
eligible section 11 defendants). Due diligence enables the issuer to minimize material er-
rors for which it would normally be strictly liable. COX ET AL., supra note 346, at 483. Also,
due diligence enables the issuer's directors and officers to establish their due diligence
defenses. Id. Of course, there are reasons other than establishing a defense to civil liability
for conducting due diligence. For example, due diligence enables underwriters to evaluate
the risks associated with the particular transaction, which may result in the deal being
restructured, delayed, or terminated and what, if any, "third party consents or approvals
are necessary in order to consummate the transaction." See Jacob, supra note 326, at 93.
349. The perspective of the reasonable investor is prescribed by statute as the standard
of liability for section 11 lawsuits. Section 11(c) clarifies that "in determining ... what
constitutes a reasonable investigation and reasonable ground[s] for belief, the standard of
reasonableness shall be that required of a prudent man in the management of his own prop-
erty." Securities Act of 1933 § 11(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(c) (2006) (emphasis added). Accord-
ingly, courts have employed that standard in determining liability for section 11
defendants. See, e.g., In re WorldCom Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 662-63 & n.41
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing the standard and section 11). Also, since the overriding purpose of
the lawyer's due diligence is to minimize the section 11 liability of her clients, any compe-
tent lawyer would consider the perspective of a potential section 11 class action plaintiff: a
reasonable investor. See id. Further, failure to catch a material misstatement or omission in
the company's registration statement may subject the lawyer to a malpractice claim by the
client (the issuer or the underwriter). See Darrel A. Rice & Marc I. Steinberg, Legal Opin-
ions in Securities Transactions,16 J. CORP. L. 375, 388, 410 (1991). Conversely, the success-
ful identification of a misstatement may win the praise of clients and enhance the lawyer's
reputation. For example, Sullivan & Cromwell garnered praise after it advised its under-
writer client, Goldman Sachs & Co., that the financial statements of Penn Central (which
later declared bankruptcy) were not reliable. See COFFEE, supra note 5, at 235 n.27.
350. Courts have noted that receipt of a lawyer's certification (Rule 10b-5 opinion) is
one factor in evaluating whether underwriters have satisfied their investigatory duties. See
Jacob, supra note 326, at 103. If the opinion is addressed to the directors of the issuer, it
assists them in establishing a due diligence defense. See Howe, supra note 346, at 287;
Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of Optimal
Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 221, 226 n.19 (1995). For the proposition
that underwriters have duties to public investors, see In re WorldCom Inc. Securities Litiga-
tion, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 662-63 (citing the SEC's statement that "[t]he underwriter who




Having disrupted the automatic tendency to associate lawyers with liti-
gators engaged in zealous advocacy, on the one hand, and gatekeepers
with auditors engaged in disinterested evaluation and certification, on the
other, the bar's descriptive claim that lawyers are functionally unique is
no longer self-evident. As a consequence, the descriptive basis for lawyer
exceptionalism has been undermined.
B. CLARIFYING THE CLIENT
Above, I've argued that the bar's rhetoric conjures up the prototype of
the human manager to represent the category of clients. Indeed, the
bar's comments mistake who the true client is. I've also argued that this
confusion fuels the bar's normative claim that lawyers should be free to
perform their noble role as zealous advocates without competing loyalties
to the state.
The straightforward debiasing response is to remind lawyers of what
they learned in law school: the client (and not the senior managers) is the
corporation, and scofflaw managers are nothing more than disloyal co-
agents. Accordingly, it is the corporate enterprise and its harmed share-
holders who deserve the solicitude that lawyers have overwhelmingly
shown for errant managers.351 But more importantly for purpose of this
Article, clarifying the identity of the client renders the bar's normative
claim irrelevant. After all, section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley and Part 205 do
not infringe upon the lawyer's duties to her true client-the
351. Comment letters evince solicitude for misbehaving managers by downplaying the
graveness of a material violation, asserting the likelihood of only Type I errors (false posi-
tives) and ignoring Type II errors (false negatives). See, e.g., Letter from 77 Law Firms,
supra note 143 ("The threat of withdrawal thus may effectively force a client to acquiesce
in following the lawyer's advice even when in good faith it strongly disagrees with the
advice and the advice may even be wrong or highly debatable."); Letter from 79 Law
Firms, supra note 131 ("Significantly, clients will understand the potential adverse conse-
quences of consulting counsel and thereafter having an honest disagreement with that
counsel."); Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2003), supra note 142 ("In
fact, if numerous public disclosures turn out to be the result of nothing more than over-
anxious lawyers allowing their conservatism to result in disagreements with clients result-
ing in public disclosure, clients as a whole will become more and more leery of working
with, or disclosing information to, cautious counsel and the risk of failures to comply with
laws will only increase."); Letter from the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. (2002),
supra note 122 ("Reasonable people, even prudent attorneys, can differ in drawing the




We can further point out that mandatory noisy withdrawal was not only
consistent with most states' professional ethics codes when Part 205 was
enacted, 353 but it also remains entirely consistent with the common law of
agency. After all, the lawyer is an agent of its principal, the corporation.
According to the Restatement of Agency, an agent is privileged to reveal
confidential information in the protection of a "superior interest of him-
self or of a third person," including information that the "principal is
committing or about to commit a crime." 354 In other words, agency law
352. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
353. As of 2002, the states generally had in place more public-spirited rules than what
the ABA had adopted in its Model Rules. Every state required the lawyer to withdraw
from representation to avoid assisting the commission of a crime or fraud or to avoid vio-
lating professional conduct rules or "other law." See Cramton et al., supra note 86, at 783;
Letter from Marshall L. Small, Senior Counsel, Morrison & Foerster LLP to Jonathan G.
Katz, Sec'y, SEC (Dec. 17, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74502/
mlsmalll.htm (presenting a Schedule of Jurisdictions Requiring Withdrawal to Avoid As-
sisting in Commission of Crime or Fraud). Furthermore, every state permitted withdrawal
in many other situations, some far less serious than the situations contemplated by Part
205. For example, lawyers are permitted to withdraw whenever "the client insists upon
pursuing an objective the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (1983) (the language of the rule was changed in 2002);
GILLERS & SIMoN, supra note 249, at 181 (detailing state versions of Model Rule 1.16
governing withdrawals). With respect to "noise," as of 2002, forty-one states allowed (and
four of them required) the lawyer to disclose confidential information to third parties to
prevent a criminal fraud. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, SELECTED
STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 161-66 (2003) (detailing state versions of
Model Rule 1.6 as of February 2002); Cramton et al., supra note 86, at 784. Also, thirty
states allowed (and two of them required) disclosure to prevent a crime. Eleven states
allowed (and two of them) required disclosure to prevent a non-criminal fraud. As noted
by Morgan and Rotunda, "In some states, criminal statutes may be interpreted broadly,
such that virtually any fraud likely to result in injury to the financial interest or property of
another would be a crime." MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra, at 161. Forty-four states al-
lowed (and three of them required) a lawyer to disclose confidential information relating
to a client's ongoing crime or fraud. MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra, at 161-66; Cramton et
al., supra note 86, at 784.
There is, however, a potential argument that the SEC's other permissive noisy with-
drawal proposal (for a past, and not ongoing, material violation that is likely to have
caused substantial harm to the company and its investors) might have conflicted with cer-
tain states' rules that prohibit disclosure of past (not ongoing) violations. See supra note
119. That rule for past material violations arguably went further than the majority of state
jurisdictions, if one deems "noise" to be tantamount to "disclosure." Only eighteen states
allowed (and two of them required) the lawyer to disclose confidential information to rec-
tify or mitigate a past crime or fraud in which the lawyer's services were used. See MORGAN
& ROTUNDA, supra, at 161-66. That said, the proposed optional noisy withdrawal provision
would have rarely been triggered. Since a good portion of undisclosed "material viola-
tions" (as defined by 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i) (2009)) are likely be deemed securities frauds,
which-by their very nature-will continue to mislead new investors until the fraud is pub-
licly disclosed (or at least until a significant amount of time has elapsed), those undisclosed
material violations are likely to be classified as "ongoing" violations rather than as "past"
violations. As a result, the provision more likely to be triggered would have been the
mandatory noisy withdrawal provision for ongoing or future violations rather than the op-
tional noisy withdrawal provision for past violations. See Cramton et al., supra, note 86, at
783 (discussing the "ongoing" nature of undisclosed frauds).
354. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 cmt. f (1958); see Hale v. Mason, 160
N.Y. 561, 567 (1899) (noting that the trustee of the company performed "an obvious duty"
when disclosing to third parties "material facts in regard to the condition" of the company,
which "had been concealed from them" by the president of the company); Willig v. Gold,
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allows an agent to reveal confidential information to prevent or mitigate
serious harm to third parties or the agent himself. Thus, a fortiori, an
agent would be privileged to reveal confidential information relating to a
co-agent's commission of crime for purposes of averting or mitigating
harm to its own principal.
In fact, the situations that implicate mandatory noisy withdrawal are
precisely those situations where significant harm to the principal is
threatened. For material violations that amount to a securities fraud
(which can constitute a crime),355 the corporation's own shareholders are
among those who are defrauded and harmed. 356 And, once the fraud is
revealed, 357 it is the corporate principal that must ordinarily compensate
the defrauded shareholders358 through judgment or settlement. This po-
75 Cal. App. 2d 809, 814 (1946) (finding no case law to support the proposition that "an
agent is under a legal duty not to disclose his principal's dishonest acts to the party prejudi-
cially affected by them"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 cmt. c (2006).
355. The proposed noisy withdrawal requirement, which the SEC ultimately retracted,
would have been triggered only if (i) the lawyer did not receive an appropriate response to
her up-the-ladder report, and (ii) she "reasonably believe[d] that a material violation [was]
ongoing or [was] about to occur and [was] likely to result in substantial injury to the finan-
cial interest or property of the issuer or of investors." SEC Initial Rule, supra note 59, at
71,705-06 (discussing what is now 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(1) (2009)). Given the definition of
"material violation" under the rules, only those unrectified violations serious enough to
potentially be classified as a securities fraud (which can amount to a crime) or other crime
would likely have triggered the lawyer's duty of noisy withdrawal. See id. Under Part 205,
the "materiality" of alleged violations is defined by reference to the federal securities case
law interpreting section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. See
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). Accordingly, the alleged violation of
federal or state law or breach of fiduciary duty must be serious enough that there is a
"substantial likelihood that the disclosure" of such violation "would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available." See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231-32; TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
448 (1976), see also SEC Final Rule, supra note 114, at 6303 n.59 (citing Basic Inc., 485 U.S.
at 281-86 and TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 438); SEC Initial Rule, supra note 59, at 41,679 n.35
and accompanying text (citing the same precedents but defining "material" as that of
"which a reasonable investor would want to be informed before making an investment
decision"). To be sure, "a duty to disclose . .. does not arise from the mere possession of
nonpublic market information" and, thus, cannot in and of itself be deemed as a securities
fraud. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980). That said, the exceptions
"threaten to swallow up the rule." See COX ET. AL, supra note 346, at 691, 694; Donald C.
Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 1639, 1643-44 (2004). Since it is a crime for any person to "willfully" violate any
statutory provision, rule, or regulation of the federal securities laws, some of the material
violations would be classifiable as criminal violations. Also, a criminal case can be made
against a defendant for mail or wire fraud or violation of the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act. See COX ET AL., supra note 346, at 862-63; see also V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1477, 1487-99 (noting the broad and expanding scope of U.S. corporate criminal liability
under environmental, antitrust, securities, and other laws).
356. Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 692-93.
357. Id. at 701 (noting reasons why ultimate detection of securities fraud is relatively
certain).
358. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2006) (providing for strict
liability of an issuer for false statements in a registration statement); id. § 12(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 771; id. § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (control person liability); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006) (broadly prescribing liability for any "person"); id. § 20(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (control person liability); Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceiv-
able and Judicially Implementing the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat
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tentially enormous payout, of course, hurts the corporation's bottom line
directly (by impacting earnings) and indirectly (through a negative share
price adjustment). 359
For material violations that do not amount to securities fraud, civil or
criminal liability is nonetheless likely to be imputed to the corporate prin-
cipal-either expressly by statute or through respondeat superior.360
Also, in the long run, material violations undermine the company's share
price by impairing the company's reputation for financial integrity,361
which in turn may hamstring the company's ability to obtain financing
down the road.362
Therefore, under agency law, mandatory noisy withdrawal calculated to
avert or mitigate harm to the corporate principal is entirely consistent
with the agent's duty of loyalty. Moreover, after acknowledging that the
client is the corporation, it becomes clear that noisy withdrawal may be
the only proper way to discharge one's duty of loyalty where intra-corpo-
rate remedies prove futile. As Stephen Gillers has observed, telling the
lawyer that she must clam up while high-level co-agents are harming the
client is nonsensical, given that "[w]e would never tolerate that instruc-
tion to a lawyer who has an individual client." 363 Just because the client
is a corporation (and not an individual) does not justify adopting a double
standard that sacrifices the firm's interests in favor of disloyal co-agents.
Also, clarifying the identity of the true client significantly deflates the
emotional appeal of the bar's normative claim. As Robert Gordon has
observed:
[T]hough businessmen running large public corporations love to
grumble about the SEC, the EPA, and OSHA-and products-liabil-
ity class-action suits-they are hardly in a position to claim that they
are like Jim Crow southern blacks, or vagrants picked up and ac-
cused of crimes: powerless outcasts and victims. Big American busi-
ness firms are not discrete and insular minorities. They have
exceptional access to influence in legislatures, administrative agen-
cies, and the courts through government advisory commissions, trade
associations, lobbies, and lawyers. 364
Superior Liability Under Section 10(b), 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 1325, 1327 n.8 (1997) (citing wide-
spread appellate court support for respondeat superior liability under section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act).
359. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 699 ("[Rjevelation of the fraud, and of the
corporation's prospective liability, has an immediate impact on the price of the issuing
corporation's stock . . . ."). A downward adjustment in share price burdens the company's
ability to raise capital in the equity markets on favorable terms.
360. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 858-59 (1984) (noting the dominance of enterprise liability in
civil and criminal law).
361. Simon, supra note 265, at 1466 n.47.
362. See Arlen & Carney, supra note 4, at 701 ("Corporations relying on public markets
for sources of future financing expect to be repeat players in securities markets; conse-
quently, they would find the long-term costs of Fraud on the Market far higher than any
short-term payoffs.").
363. Gillers, supra note 250, at 304.
364. Gordon, supra note 191, at 1199.
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In truth, the lawyer's client is not a vulnerable human being who faces
imminent catastrophe (such as imprisonment or deportation) but rather a
legally sophisticated and economically powerful organization 365 which
has no "soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked."366 ThUS, it is
difficult to characterize the lawyer's role as safeguarding the dignity and
autonomy of her client. In truth, the client has not yet been charged with
the alleged law violation and either is or will be a "repeat player" in han-
dling these types of situations. 367 Accordingly, it is difficult to see the
distinctive valor and sanctity of the lawyer's efforts when guiding her cli-
ent to redress potential violations in compliance with Part 205.368
Finally, since the client corporation is a creature of law-a juridical
person whose character the law has the power to construct 369-why
shouldn't the lawyer's relationship to that entity be constrained by duties
crafted to protect the long-term interests of that entity, its shareholders,
or the integrity of the capital markets?370 After all, even the zealous ad-
365. Some will object to my characterization of public companies as legally sophisti-
cated and economically powerful organizations and will argue that, in the context of crimi-
nal prosecutions, the power of any individual corporation is vastly outstripped by the
power of the "United States of America." But this objection suffers from at least three
complications. First, this objection masks the reality of many understaffed government
agencies, which face tremendous opportunity costs in prosecuting any single case and espe-
cially white-collar criminal cases, which tend to be resource-intensive. See Seigel, supra
note 293, at 17-20. Second, this objection overstates the vulnerability of some criminal
defendants and their lawyers. As David Luban notes, there are two worlds of criminal
defense lawyers: (i) "public defenders and panel attorneys working for $40 an hour" and
(ii) "white-collar defense lawyers, the mob lawyers, the Miami drug bar." David Luban,
Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1763 (1992). Third, as pointed
out in Part III.A, supra, it is unclear why criminal prosecution is the relevant context.
After all, legitimate advocacy of criminal defense lawyers is expressly exempted from the
Part 205 reporting requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(7)(ii) (2009); supra note 294 and
accompanying text.
366. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386 (1980)
(quoting Edward, First & Baron Thurlow, 1731-1806).
367. See Galanter, supra note 270, at 97-104 (describing the category of "repeat play-
ers" in litigation, which may include insurance companies, prosecutors and finance
companies).
368. To be clear, I do not believe that corporations are bad or that advising them is
tantamount to working with the devil. In fact, my fiduciary duty analysis calls for taking
the entity seriously and treating corporations with the due regard that lawyers give (or are
supposed to give) individual clients. See George C. Harris, Taking the Entity Theory Seri-
ously: Lawyer Liability for Failure to Prevent Harm to Organizational Clients Through Dis-
closure of Constituent Wrongdoing, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL Erics 597, 599-600 (1998)
(advocating a theory of loyal disclosures). One can believe that corporations, as collective
enterprises, do tremendous good and that serving them has social value and still believe
that corporate representation should be constrained by explicit duties designed to prevent
harm to the corporation, its constituents, or the capital markets. Because of the limited
purposes of this Article, I do not revisit the wisdom of having adopted the entity theory of
legal representation for corporations (which is the current state of the law), as opposed to
an alternative theory, e.g., the group theory of legal representation. Practically speaking,
that ship has long sailed. I do believe, however, that a more public-spirited conceptualiza-
tion of the lawyer's role is reconcilable with the entity theory of representation.
369. Gordon, supra note 191, at 1199-1200.
370. 1 do not address the issue of whether the SEC should formally designate "share-
holders" or "public investors" as the explicit intended beneficiaries of lawyers' gatekeeping
duties. See Bainbridge & Johnson, supra note 249, at 324 (raising the possibility of mea-
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vocacy of the litigator is constrained by explicit duties to protect the in-
tegrity of judicial proceedings. 3 71
CONCLUSION
The gatekeeping wars have been going on for decades. After some
scandal, the SEC attempts to place greater gatekeeping responsibilities
on lawyers, who predictably backlash, and the SEC backs down. In each
major battle, the details differ, and minor gains and losses are made on
the battlefield. But the overall script remains the same.
A powerful component of that script is the appeal to lawyer exception-
alism-the basis for the legal profession's resistance to gatekeeping. It
contends that lawyers are different. Accordingly, they should be treated
differently, sans gatekeeping obligations. And this line of argument
seems so compelling because it taps into basic categorical processing that
generates a contrast effect and client confusion. Because we think of the
lawyer as the litigator engaged in zealous advocacy and the gatekeeper as
the auditor engaged in disinterested evaluation and certification, the con-
trast between the categories seems stark. Because we think that the cli-
ent is the human manager, we slip easily into client confusion. It quickly
becomes a stylized story of the lone wolf individual against authoritarian
government, with the lawyer's virtue of loyalty on the line.
Again, the goal of this Article has not been to make the substantive
case that lawyers should be gatekeepers with elevated obligations en-
forceable by the SEC, although I do think that the case for gatekeeping is
strong.372 To make that case would require a comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis of integrating securities lawyers into a gatekeeper enforcement
regime.37 3 Moreover, such analysis would have to address all considera-
tions, including the common objection that gatekeeping duties will chill
sures that "would effectively transform securities lawyers into auditors"); Coffee, supra
note 344, at 1293, 1295 (arguing in favor of securities attorney having "guardian-like re-
sponsibilities to investors who rely upon the disclosures that the securities attorney typi-
cally prepares or at least reviews"); Gordon, supra note 191, at 1207-16 (advancing "an
alternative conception of the corporate counselor's role"). See generally Coffee, supra note
331 (exploring the issue of whether lawyers issuing legal opinions owe a duty to the public).
371. See supra Part III.A.1.a.
372. As Robert Gordon has pointed out to me, lawyers are valuable to their clients to
the extent, but only to the extent, that they can be trusted by constituents and third parties
not to game the system in a way that damages the entity, the integrity of the capital mar-
kets, and the legal framework. Stated another way, by closing fraudulent deals and vouch-
ing for dubious transactions on the pretext that the manager is entitled to make all risk
management decisions, lawyers are "squandering the stock of legitimacy and credibility"
that the profession has accrued and continues to sustain through its rhetoric of public au-
thority and responsibility. Dezalay, supra notel89, at 279.
373. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 344, at 1302 (arguing that lawyers should be gatekeep-
ers and noting that the social costs of exempting lawyers from gatekeeping "would be real
and adverse"). To perform the cost-benefit analysis, one might consider the relative
strengths and weaknesses of various gatekeeping professionals. See Kim, supra note 5, at
415-22 (setting forth a framework by which the gatekeeping potential of various profes-
sionals may be compared and applying that framework to compare inside and outside law-
yers). For a proposal about how to evaluate a gatekeeper enforcement strategy, see
Kraakman, supra note 5, at 61-66.
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lawyer-client communications.374 Instead, my focus has been narrower:
to unpack the rhetorical scripts, to lay bare their deficiencies, and to sug-
gest how they might be neutralized.
In the end, we know that lawyers will fight to preserve a world in which
their legal duties rarely, if ever, require them to take an ethical stand
against errant managers. In that world, lawyers like Carter and Johnson
never have to resign and can continue to do what they've always done:
give advice, get paid, and watch. They can sincerely say that they are just
doing their jobs-and performing a valiant service at that.3 75 That world
happens to be a more psychologically comfortable world where there are
"no hard choices to be made, no price to be paid in the name of eth-
ics." 37 6 Those who seek a different world must learn how to frame it. My
suggestions are offered to help us see that world come to be.
374. The "chilling communications" objection represents the most commonly invoked
cost consideration. For responses to this objection, see, for example, WILLIAM H. SIMON,
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHics 54-62 (1998); Coffee, supra
note 344, at 1307-10; Cramton et al., supra note 86, at 814-17; Simon, supra note 265, at
1453-55; Gillers, supra note 249, at 303; Kim, supra note 110, at 1069-71; Rotunda, supra
note 34, at 477-78; Seigel, supra note 293, at 32-46.
375. See Rhode, supra note 86, at 594 ("For most attorneys, advancing client interests
remains the primary means of securing financial success and professional status. A critical
function of professional ideology is to make a virtue out of that necessity.").
376. Wetlaufer, supra note 244, at 1272.
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